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ESSAYS ON SPATIAL, VERTICAL PRICE TRANSMISSION AND ASYMMETRIC 
SUPPLY RESPONSE IN LIVESTOCK SECTORS 
JongYeol Yoon 
Dr. Scott Brown, Dissertation Supervisor 
ABSTRACT 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine efficient price transmission mechanism and 
efficient supply system in livestock sectors. The first essay investigates market integration 
and spatial price transmission in beef trade among the TPP countries (Australia, United 
States, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan) by using monthly beef prices. The estimates of 
the magnitude and the short-run speed of adjustment for one price to the shocks of another 
between two countries is useful information in assessing how well change in one price is 
transmitted to another and what types of price transmission (symmetry or asymmetry) 
occur in beef trade. This helps to identify the existence of potential market inefficiencies 
that result from asymmetric adjustment and which country leads the price relationship in 
beef trade. For this purpose, Engle-Granger and Johansen co-integration tests are 
conducted. In addition, threshold autoregressive (TAR) model and momentum threshold 
autoregressive (M-TAR) model, and asymmetric (or symmetric) error correction model 
(ECM) are estimated to examine the patterns of price adjustment. The findings indicate 
that the all pairs of prices are found to be statistically significant for the co-integration test. 
This suggests that there a long-run equilibrium relationship between pairs of price series 
and the various types of beef traded by the TPP countries are likely to be substituted for 
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each other in each market. In addition, the results of the TAR and M-TAR models provide 
sufficient empirical evidence in support of asymmetric pricing behavior in beef trade 
among the TPP countries, mostly showing that the rate of adjustment to negative shocks to 
long-run equilibrium tends to occur more rapidly than that for the positive price shocks 
among the TPP countries. To examine the short-run dynamic of beef trade among the TPP 
countries, two types of the ECM are estimated. The estimates of the error correction terms 
indicate that the response of one price depends on either positive shocks or negative shocks 
in another price among the bilateral relationships analyzed, and they show different speeds 
of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium and different price leadership, respectively. The 
asymmetric pattern of price adjustment may attribute to product differentiation through 
different feeding methods, trade policy, and market concentration in each country. Due to 
these factors, relatively slow speed of price adjustment to the equilibrium can cause 
potential losses to market participants in each market, and therefore it should be corrected 
in order to improve market efficiency in beef trade among the TPP countries. 
The second essay aims to investigate asymmetric supply response of cattle, hog, 
and chicken in the U.S. This concern can be described in the context of structural change 
of U.S. meat markets. That is, the move to larger operations that have resulted from the 
economies of scale that exist in many of these sectors today results in an inability to adjust 
to low prices because of the high capital outlays associated with the large facilities yet these 
same economies of scale allow for quick expansion in periods of high prices. For this 
purpose, the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model and momentum threshold 
autoregressive (M-TAR) model are performed. The empirical results of the M-TAR model 
suggests that there is the evidence in support of the presence of asymmetric supply of hog 
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and chicken. In contrast, the M-TAR model supports symmetric supply response for cattle. 
Only the finding for hog industry is consistent with the a priori expectation that the positive 
deviation from the long-run equilibrium created by the producers’ expectation of high 
profitability may tend to quickly adjust to a new equilibrium while the negative discrepancy 
created by the producers’ expectation of low profitability tends to persist. Overall, the 
empirical results suggest that there is evidence in support of symmetric supply response 
for cattle industry, while there is the presence of asymmetric supply response for hog and 
chicken industry. These findings imply that the recent structural change in cattle industry 
contribute to improving the production efficiency for cattle, but in hog and chicken industry, 
there might exist potential production inefficiencies. 
The purpose of third essay is to examine asymmetric price transmission in the U.S. 
pork market. The motivation of this study is found in the structural change in the U.S. pork 
market that is characterized by more extensive and intensive operations, consolidation of 
the small and medium scale producers, and the many mergers and acquisitions of meat 
packers and retailers. In consideration of the various stages of the market linked primarily 
by price mechanisms, the degree and the speed of adjustment to which prices are 
transmitted in the marketing chain can play a role in understanding how price transmission 
works in terms of market efficiency and in assessing direction and distribution of welfare 
effects in a normative fashion. For this purpose, threshold co-integration analysis is applied 
by allowing for asymmetric pattern of price adjustment towards a long-run equilibrium in 
the price relationship between farm and wholesale, and retail levels. The asymmetric error 
correction model is specified to estimate the short-run adjustment speed of price response 
towards a long-run steady state. The empirical findings suggest that there might be 
xii 
asymmetric price adjustment in the U.S. pork market while its pattern appears to be 
different across marketing channels. That is, the response of wholesalers tends to be 
quicker to increases in producer price (i.e., margin squeezing) than to decreases in producer 
prices (i.e., margin stretching), while wholesale prices respond more quickly to decreases 
in retail prices. These may be generally understood in the presence of non-competitive 
pricing behavior of agents at a certain chain beyond farm gate. Such findings imply that 
the recent structural changes in the U.S. pork market may hinder efficient price 
transmission mechanism across the marketing channels.  
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CHAPTER 1: BEEF MARKET INTEGRATION AND PRICE 
TRANSMISSION IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP) 
COUNTRIES 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Research on testing for market integration and on identifying price relationships of 
agricultural products has been conducted with respect to the growing trend for market 
liberalization (Ghoshray, 2007), especially with regard to spreading large competition for 
regional economic integration such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is at 
the very center of this kind of global trend. A successful TPP agreement results in one of 
the largest integrated regional market in the world1.   The TPP markets are expected to be 
a crucial driver of international economic growth. According to a United States Department 
of Agriculture, Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS) report (ERS 2014), the 
combined population and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the TPP partners account for 
11 percent (about 800 million people) and 36 percent (about $28 trillion) of the global level 
of GDP, respectively, in 2012. In addition, the average agricultural imports of the TPP 
partners account for 51 percent (averaging about $279 billion) of the global average value 
                                                          
1 The TPP is a free trade agreement negotiated by 12 countries in Asia and the Pacific region, 
including Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, the United States, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Canada and Japan.  
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of imports and 43 percent (averaging $312 billion) of the world agricultural exports is 
traded by the TPP countries. 
In the agricultural sector of the TPP, one of the important agricultural products is 
beef (bovine meat). The TPP region is generally defined as the Pacific basin, and the Pacific 
beef market has been regarded as the premium beef market (Morgan and Tallard, 2015). 
The major exporters for this market include Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and 
Canada. Moreover, one of the biggest importers of this premium beef is Japan. The 
aggregated trade in beef within the TPP is projected to have the greatest value, which is 
estimated to increase to 43 percent (about $3.7 billion) in 2025 (ERS, 2014). The volume 
of beef which is exported by these countries accounted for about 70% of the total exported 
beef in the world in 2014, with about 30 percent of the beef exported by Australia and 
United States. Furthermore, among the TPP members, Australia, the United States, New 
Zealand, Canada and Mexico account for about 42 percent of total beef exports. The beef 
imported in the world is dominated by Hong Kong, Russia, Japan, China and the United 
States which capture about 52 percent of the total beef imported in 2014, with about 30 
percent of the global beef imported destined for Japan, Canada and the United States within 
the TPP region. Given the large scale of the beef trade led by the TPP countries, it is worth 
learning the characteristics of the beef market in terms of market efficiency and the role in 
trading beef in each bilateral trade relationship. 
 An integrated market is regarded as a market where prices of differentiated 
commodities do not behave independently (Diakosavvas, 1995). In terms of the integrated 
beef market, price transmission is measured by the response of the beef price in one country 
to change in the beef price in another country, as reflecting the extent of market integration 
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and which markets function efficiently (Rapsomanikis and Conforti, 2006). Thus, the 
magnitude to which a price is transmitted to another would be useful information for policy 
makers who need an indicator to make or correct policies associated with agriculture and 
researchers who need to construct the model for agricultural price analysis and forecasting. 
In addition, the extent and the pattern of price transmission might have policy implications 
on welfare distribution for producers and consumers in the domestic market (Goychuk and 
Meyers, 2014).         
The focus of this paper is to investigate market integration and asymmetric price 
transmission in beef trade among the TPP countries. In order to do this, two main questions 
can be addressed in this paper: 1) are beef prices of the TPP countries co-integrated in each 
bilateral relationship; and 2) Is price transmission of co-integrated pairs of prices is 
symmetric? In econometric concepts, if the linear combination of non-stationary series 
between pairs of prices can be co-integrated, it implies that there is the presence of a long-
run relationship for the pair of prices. In addition, Goletti and Babu (1994) state that “if the 
market system were well integrated, then price increases should be transmitted to the same 
extent as price decreases”. Theoretically, a stable tendency that bring prices back toward it 
by arbitrage process is explained by The Law of One Price (LOP) (OECD, 2001; Ghoshray, 
2002), which implicitly assumes symmetric price transmission or a linear manner for price 
transmission. 
In general, quality differences, transaction costs, imperfect competition, policy 
intervention and exchange rates can be considered the main factors that impede prices to 
converge to a long-run equilibrium and symmetric price transmission (Ghoshray, 2002; 
Abdulai, 2000; Rapsomanikis et al., 2006; Goychuk and Meyers, 2014). Of these factors, 
4 
quality differences, imperfect competition and trade policy are highly related to the Pacific 
beef market. Beef quality varies depending on the breed and feeding methods, condition of 
finished products (fresh/chilled beef vs. frozen beef), industrial characteristics of 
production, processing and the distributional system (Diakosavvas, 1995). For instance, 
beef production in the United States and Canada is dominated by grain-fed beef, beef 
produced in Australia and New Zealand is from free range cattle, fed on grass pastures. 
The storage property of final products based on either fresh/chilled or frozen can be an 
important criteria to gauge the quality of beef. In general, beef produced by grain-fed cattle 
and fresh/chilled beef can be perceived as higher quality beef than beef from grass-fed 
cattle and frozen beef in the beef market. In addition, consumers prefer grain-fed to grass-
fed beef and fresh/chilled beef is preferred to frozen beef by consumers. Given the facts, 
beef exporters with relatively higher quality beef may obtain a premium in beef trade. 
Therefore, it is possible to expect that beef exporters with relatively higher quality beef 
may adjust prices at much slower rates with respect to a decrease in prices by other beef 
exporters with lower quality beef.  
Non-competitive behavior is widely referred to as a description of asymmetric price 
transmission (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 1998; Ghoshray, 2002). In beef trade 
among the TPP countries, given that there is a high level of dependence on exports or 
imports in certain countries, imperfect competition in beef trade may exist, which may lead 
to asymmetric price transmission. For example, the imported beef market in Japan, which 
is dominated by Australia and the United States together, supply about 91 percent of total 
beef imports in 2015. Carter and MacLaren (1997) suggest that the Japanese market of beef 
imports can be characterized by a Stackelberg model with price leadership by Australia. In 
5 
addition, the top three exporting countries (Australia, New Zealand, and Canada) rely 
highly on the United States as a market for their beef exports2. In this case, it is possible to 
conjecture that the buyers for the imported beef may enjoy local market power. Therefore, 
the plausible behavior of buyers for the beef imports from these countries is that change in 
prices that squeeze margins may be more quickly passed through than change in prices that 
stretch margins. 
Government interventions such as tariffs and tariff rate quotas can create a price 
wedge between prices in spatially different market, which eliminate the opportunity for 
price arbitrage (OECD, 2001). These policy instruments may lead to undermining the link 
between pairs of prices or proportional price transmission to a change in another price. 
Given the possible conjectures of beef trade described above, analysis of this study 
is used to confirm beef market inefficiencies in the TPP countries. Such knowledge also 
plays a role as an essential factor on how to correct the potential market inefficiencies for 
policy purpose. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review 
of the literature associated with market integration, price transmission, and asymmetric 
price transmission. Section 3 highlights the econometric methods. Section 4 introduces the 
times series data to be analyzed in this study. Section 5 presents the empirical results and 
section 6 concludes the paper.  
2 For Australia, beef exports of Australia and New Zealand to the United States account for 30.8% 
and 53.0% of the total beef exports, respectively. For Canada, the proportion of fresh and frozen 
beef exports to the United States is 94.9% and 29.0%, respectively. 
6 
 
1.2. Literature review  
1.2.1. Beef (including livestock) market integration and price transmission 
Past studies on the beef market have mainly focused on examining the effect of a 
disease affecting cattle, such as Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or Foot and 
Mouth Disease (FMD), on its domestic industry. In terms of beef market integration, the 
main study has been dominated by investigating the effects of vertical integration by beef 
marketing channels. However, there has not been significant research on beef market 
integration analysis on the world stage. In addition, the analytic tools that have been used 
are mainly the bivariate correlation coefficient and regression.  
There are several studies testing integration of the world beef market. Dries and 
Unnevehr (1990) examine the impact of policy intervention in the major trading nations on 
pricing process in the FMD-free and FMD-endemic segments of the world market by using 
simple correlation coefficients and by conducting Granger causality tests. The main 
findings of Dries and Unnevehr include the following conclusions. First, beef market 
segmentation exists, but the extent of it weakens over time. Second, prices have been 
isolated in the European Union import market from others due to a closed policy of the 
European Union import market by leading to greater price integration between the FMD 
segmented markets and by forcing exporters from both segments to compete directly in 
new import markets. Third, the United States is revealed to be the price leader in world 
beef markets because of market size as well as the United States policies that allow 
transmission of price information from the United States market to the world but not vice 
versa. Diakosavvas (1995) investigates market integration between Australia and the 
United States beef price at the farm gate level by applying co-integration analysis and a 
7 
time-varying parameter estimation procedure from a Kalman filter model. The main results 
of this paper are that beef prices between Australia and the United States are co-integrated, 
albeit non-perfectly, and that there is not much effect on convergence between the pairs of 
prices. In addition, the extent to convergence between the various price pairs has not 
significantly increased over time. Based on these results, Australian prices cannot be used 
as a world price. 
Meanwhile, McNew (1996) states that market integration is identified with “market 
connectedness”, which relates to the dynamics of price shock transmission. This notion is 
considered as a new view of market integration (Vollrath and Hallahan, 2006). In the 
context of this perspective, Vollrath and Hallahan (2006) examine the extent to which U.S.-
Canadian meat and livestock markets represent price integration based upon the 
transmission of shocks across national boundaries by adopting the law-of-one price (LOP) 
to test market efficiency and the vector autoregressive (VAR) model to test price shock 
transference.  In the results of VAR analysis, Canadian and United States hog and pork 
product markets were found to be more integrated than Canadian and United States steer 
and beef product markets. Miljkovic (2009) investigates market integration between 
Canada and the United States by considering both trade flows of livestock (and beef meat) 
and livestock prices (cointegration analysis) and examines the effects of shocks about the 
BSE outbreak on livestock prices through trade dependence. The conclusion of Miljkovic’s 
analysis is that livestock and beef prices between two countries are cointegrated, which 
means the existence of market integration, despite market segmentation due to livestock 
and beef import bans which resulted from BSE. Canada’s trade dependence in livestock 
and beef is cointegrated with Canadian and United States livestock prices. However, the 
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prices in the market with a high level of dependence on trade are very sensitive to external 
shocks like those experienced with BSE, could lead to a decrease in trade quantity. In this 
sense, as the trade dependence variable is shocked, the effects on Canadian and U.S. prices 
are completely opposite, i.e., the United States beef price is held at a higher level for long-
run equilibrium but Canadian livestock prices decrease sharply or remain below the long-
run equilibrium.  
1.2.2. Literature review on asymmetric price transmission.    
The main concern for asymmetric adjustment over long-term balance relationship 
arises from various factors, including government interventions of international trade and 
domestic price policies, distorting spatial arbitrage conditions and market structure 
accompanying high transfer costs and large marketing margins that might hinder perfectly 
competitive market systems. In this case, for example, the relationship between two prices 
of spatially different markets might entail non-proportional responses with increasing 
phase or decreasing phase from the change in one price to another countries’ price. 
Especially in international trade for agricultural commodities, perceiving the actual 
conditions of non-competitive behavior that impede the pass-through of price signals has 
been the subject matter of many studies on market integration and price transmission. In 
this context non-linearity tests for market integration or price transmission might be the 
alternative method for linear tests for market integration or price transmission 
(Rapsomanikis et al., 2006; Ghoshray, 2002).   
To test, both vertically and spatially, market integration and price transmission, 
various econometric tools have been applied in the literature by using the different scope 
of time series analysis (Rapsomanikis et al., 2006). These quantitative techniques have 
9 
evolved over time. Even though the study on asymmetric price transmission for spatially 
different agricultural commodity markets has been focus, due to the important economic 
meaning associated with welfare distribution (Goychuk and Meyers, 2014), there has been 
little research into asymmetric price adjustment of the world beef market. In fact, the 
agricultural commodities that have received much interest by researchers who have 
conducted studies on asymmetric price adjustment are mainly food and cash crops such as 
wheat, rice and coffee. In addition, most studies on asymmetric price transmission for meat 
and livestock markets are dominated by analysis of the vertical transmission in the 
marketing channel (Awokuse and Wang, 2009). Even though the scope of analysis and 
policy implications of the results for asymmetric price transmission between a vertical 
approach and a spatial approach are different, knowledge regarding statistical techniques 
and analytic procedures applied for these studies might be useful in determining the 
appropriate statistical methods for testing the threshold type adjustment in this paper.    
There are several studies that have utilized the threshold co-integration models that 
explain the potentials for nonlinear and threshold type adjustment in time series. The study 
by Goodwin and Holt (1999) examines the vertically asymmetric price transmission 
through the market channel for U.S. beef price and another study by Goodwin and Harper 
(2000) investigates the price transmission among the farm, wholesale and retail U.S. pork 
market segments. In order to estimate the threshold between 5 percent and 95 percent of 
the largest negative residuals or positive residuals both studies used a two-dimensional grid 
search proposed by Balke and Fomby (1997). The results of the former study supported 
the evidence of asymmetric price transmission that tends to be transmitted one way from 
farm to wholesale to retail levels but not vice versa. In the latter, they found that threshold 
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effects and asymmetric adjustment are significant. In addition, price transmission is 
unidirectional with causal flowing up from farm to wholesale to retail markets.     
More recently, the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model and the momentum 
threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) model introduced by Enders and Granger (1988) are 
widely applied to test asymmetric price transmission. Abdulai (2002) investigated 
asymmetric price transmission in the Swiss pork market using threshold cointegration 
models. The results suggested that price transmission between the producer and retail 
market showed asymmetric adjustment behavior. Another study by Awokuse and Wang 
(2009) investigate asymmetric price transmission in U.S. dairy markets. The findings of 
this study suggest that there is the presence of asymmetric price adjustment from farm gate 
to retail stages for only butter and fluid milk.   
Further, the study by Ghoshray (2002) examined asymmetric price transmission in 
the global wheat markets by applying the TAR model and the M-TAR model. The 
empirical results in this study show that the international wheat market appears to be 
greatly unitary and that there is lack of evidence for asymmetric price adjustment. However, 
some results of asymmetric adjustment may attribute to the quality difference of wheat 
reflecting different end-uses. Another study by Goychuk and Meyers (2014) was conducted 
to investigate price integration between the Black Sea and international wheat markets. To 
do this, the Johansen ML test and Engle-Granger co-integration test are used. In addition, 
the TAR and the M-TAR model for testing asymmetric price transmission are employed 
as well. The results of this study indicates that co-integrating relationships between Russian 
wheat prices and EU wheat prices and U.S. wheat prices are valid. In addition, the 
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Ukrainian wheat prices are co-integrated with the French wheat price. The study concludes 
that there is the existence of symmetric price transmission in the world wheat market. 
The major contribution of the work conducted here is the application of the recently 
developed methods to the case of the integration of international beef markets. Therefore, 
the main focus of this paper is to test for asymmetric pattern of price adjustment in long-
run equilibrium relationship between prices. In this paper, the methodology of estimation 
and testing the asymmetric price transmission follows the TAR and M-TAR proposed by 
Enders and Granger (1998). The application of the methodology for analyzing price 
asymmetry, known as TAR and M-TAR is important because “it addresses the inferential 
limitations of previous studies that failed to account for the non-stationarity and nonlinear 
behavior of agricultural price series” (Awokuse and Wang, 2009). 
1.3. Econometric methods 
For this research it is first necessary to test the presence of a unit root for the 
individual series because the spurious regression problem may occur if the series are non-
stationary. The three tests are applied to test for the stationarity of series: 1) the Augmented 
Dickey–Fuller (ADF), 2) Phillips–Perron (PP), 3) Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and 
Shin (KPSS). The KPSS test can be regarded as a robustness method to check for 
stationarity in the series as compared to the results of other approaches. Since the null 
hypothesis of the ADF and the PP tests is that the series has the unit root while the KPSS 
test’s null hypothesis is that the series is stationary. For this reason, if there is not sufficient 
evidence in support of stationarity of the series, the ADF and the PP test result in a low 
power to reject the null, which could lead to Type II errors (Goychuck and Meyers, 2014). 
In this sense, the KPSS can make up for the shortcoming of others. In this paper, the 
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decision making for stationarity of series is made if two of three tests support the 
stationarity of the series analyzed. The lowest value of the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) is used to determine appropriate lag length in the stationary tests. Determination of 
lag length is important for time series analysis because when the length of lag is too small, 
a white noise process of the error terms cannot be guaranteed due to serial correlation of 
the error terms. It might result in obtaining biased estimates. On the other hand, taking 
longer lag lengths will cause a loss in degrees of freedom. 
Two co-integration tests are used in this research. The Engle and Granger and 
Johansen co-integration test are applied to check the long-run relationship between two 
beef prices. Further, by using the Johansen co-integration test, both the total number of co-
integrating relationships and the long-run relationship for pairwise of price series are 
detected. 
First, the Engle and Granger (1987) co-integration test is performed in two stages. 
Initially, the co-integrating equation composed of the pairs of prices is estimated as shown 
in Equation (1.1). 
𝑃𝑡
𝐴 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑡
𝐵 + 𝜀𝑡    (1.1)
where 𝑃𝑡
𝐴 and 𝑃𝑡
𝐵 are A’s country prices and B’s country prices, respectively. Price terms
are expressed in logarithm in the regression. α0 represents the transfer costs, α1 indicates 
the elasticity of price transmission. 𝜀𝑡  is the error term. Next, tests for stationarity of 
residuals from Equation (1.1) is conducted by using the ADF, PP and KPSS test. If the test 
result is that the residuals are stationary, then the pairs of series analyzed are co-integrated 
with each other. This result implies that the two series move together in the long run. One 
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advantage of the Engle-Granger test is that the test is less sensitive to the distribution 
assumption so that it is more efficient to test for co-integration relative to the Johansen test 
(Goychuk and Meyers, 2014). However, the Engle-Granger test has a limitation in testing 
for only a pair of series.  
Johansen’s co-integration method has been a very popular approach to test for the 
presence of co-integrating vectors in the field of time series analysis. Although the 
Johansen method is more sensitive to the normality assumption as compared to the Engle-
Granger test, it is well suited for co-integration test to multivariate series by obtaining more 
than one co-integration relationship. Thus, Johansen’s co-integration test would be helpful 
to detect how many a pairs of series are co-integrated among six price series used in this 
study.   
Johansen’s approach initially takes its starting point in the general VAR(p) model 
of order of the lower case of p given by: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝑃𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡      𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇    (1.2) 
where 𝑃𝑡 is an n × 1 vector of variables, and 𝛽 is the coefficient matrix. This VAR can be 
re-written as the following vector ECM 
∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + Π𝑃𝑡−1 + ∑ Γ𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1
∆𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡     (1.3) 
where ∆ denotes first difference, Π indicates the long-run effects, Γ𝑖 stands for the dynamic 
effects. The term of Π𝑃𝑡−1  has information on the co-integrating relationship among 
variables in 𝑃𝑡. Thus, the Johansen co-integration test mainly aims to estimate the rank (r) 
of the matrix, Π. If its rank is 0 < r < n, then there exist n × r matrices α and β with rank 
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r such that Π = α𝛽′and 𝛽′𝑍𝑡 is stationary, where 𝛽 represents the adjustment parameter, 
and α stands for a co-integrating vector. The 𝑟  indicates the number of co-integration 
relationships. 
Meanwhile, Enders and Granger (1998), on the other hand, indicate that the 
inconsistent results of co-integration might be derived due to asymmetric adjustment of 
series. Therefore, they suggest an alternative specification allowing for asymmetric 
adjustment such as threshold autoregressive (TAR) model, and it can be written in the form 
of (1.4) ~ (1.6): 
∆𝜀?̂? = 𝐼𝑡𝛾1𝜀?̂?−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝑡)𝛾2𝜀?̂?−1 + 𝜔𝑡      (1.4) 
where ∆𝜀?̂? is changes in the {𝜀?̂?} from Equations (1.1), 𝛾1 is coefficients of adjustment to 
positive deviation, and 𝛾2  is coefficients of adjustment to negative discrepancies. The 
specification of the Heaviside indicator function (𝐼𝑡) is in the forms of Equation (1.5) and 
(1.6), which depends on estimated threshold (𝜏)3;  
                                                          
3 Chan (1993) suggests that it is necessary to find the possible long-run equilibrium values to 
minimize the sum of squared errors from the fitted model as a super-consistent estimate of threshold. 
The estimation procedures of the threshold proposed by Chan (1993) utilize the following steps: 
first, residual series (∆𝜀?̂?) from co-integrating equation are arranged in ascending sort, second, 15 
percent of the minimum and maximum observations are excluded, and then the rest of  70 percent 
of the observations are used as a potential threshold. Finally, the equation is estimated with 
Equations (1.4), (1.5), and (1.6) for each potential threshold value, then the equation with the lowest 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) is chosen. Therefore, it can be considered as the best estimate 
threshold parameter (𝜏).  
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𝐼𝑡 = {
1      𝑖𝑓      𝜀?̂?−1 ≥ 𝜏  
0      𝑖𝑓      𝜀?̂?−1 < 𝜏
       (1.5) 
𝐼𝑡 = {
1      𝑖𝑓      Δ𝜀?̂?−1 ≥ 𝜏  
0      𝑖𝑓     Δ 𝜀?̂?−1 < 𝜏
     (1.6) 
 According to Ghoshray (2002, p 305), in some cases, “if the co-integrating vector 
which includes a constant in the co-integrating space coincides with the attractor, the 
consistent threshold could be equal to zero”. If it is not expected that the co-integrating 
vector will be consistent with the attractor, it is necessary to estimate a super-consistent 
threshold parameter.  
The combination of Equation (1.4) and (1.5) stand for the TAR model and the 
combination of Equation (1.4) and (1.6) represent the M-TAR model. Enders and Granger 
(1998) describe both models that the “deep” movement of {𝜀?̂?} can be captured by the TAR 
model, “sharp” movement of {𝜀?̂?} can be detected by the M-TAR model
4. To interpret the 
adjustment rate of 𝛾1  and 𝛾2 , if for example, −1 < 𝛾1 < 𝛾2 < 0 , the TAR model 
represents that the positive discrepancies of the 𝜀?̂? series will tend to return rapidly toward 
the long-run equilibrium relative to the negative discrepancies of the 𝜀?̂? series. Furthermore, 
if, for example, |𝛾1| < |𝛾2| , the M-TAR model suggests that the negative  ∆𝜀?̂?−1  is 
substantially in decay, while the positive ∆𝜀?̂?−1 is little adjusted to the long-run equilibrium.  
                                                          
4 With the definition of the two terms as to “deep” and “sharp” described by Ghoshray (2002, p 
301), “deepness indicates the asymmetry in the magnitude of peaks and troughs and steepness 
represents the asymmetry in the form of differing speeds at which peaks and troughs are 
approached”.  
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To test for asymmetric price transmission in the case of the TAR and M-TAR 
models, the first procedure is to check for co-integration of the analyzed series. The Φ-
statistics for the null hypothesis (𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0) that the series are not co-integrated is 
applied. The critical values of the Φ-statistics are computed by Enders and Granger (1998). 
If the null hypothesis (𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0) is rejected, the series are co-integrated. This 
allows us to test for the asymmetric price adjustment with regard to the co-integrated pairs 
of series. In this case, F-statistics for the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment (𝐻0: 𝛾1 =
𝛾2) are recorded. If the null hypothesis is retained, there is sufficient evidence in support 
of the presence of symmetric price adjustment. Diagnostic checking for a white noise 
process for the residuals 𝜔𝑡 is performed by using the Ljung-Box test. If the residuals are 
serially correlated, Equation (1.4) should be re-estimated by adding the additional lags of 
∆𝜀?̂? in the form: 
∆𝜀?̂? = 𝐼𝑡𝛾1𝜀?̂?−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝑡)𝛾2𝜀?̂?−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
Δ𝜀?̂?−1 + 𝜔𝑡      (1.7) 
Testing for asymmetric adjustment has important implications for welfare effects 
and market efficiencies. The slow or differing price adjustment of one price to either 
positive or negative shocks to change in another price is regarded as potential losses to 
market participants. That is, there might be the potential market inefficiency in beef trade. 
Therefore, it is necessary for policy makers to consider the welfare impact on consumers 
and producers resulting from the asymmetric price transmission when they make price 
policy (Awokuse and Wang 2009). If two price series are co-integrated and their 
adjustment is symmetric, the standard error correction model (ECM) is the following form: 
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Δ𝑃𝑡
𝐴 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝜀?̂?−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
Δ𝑃𝑡−𝑖
𝐴 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
Δ𝑃𝑡−𝑗
𝐵 +𝜇𝑡      (1.8) 
where Δ𝑃𝑡
𝐴 and Δ𝑃𝑡
𝐵 are the logged first differenced prices by country, 𝜀?̂?−1 stands for the 
lagged residual from Equation (1.1), 𝜇𝑡 is the error term, and 𝑎1 represents the short-run 
adjustment rate to the long-run equilibrium. The negative sign of 𝑎1 should be confirmed. 
The selection of the correct lag length is conducted by minimum value of the SBC. 
Meanwhile, the test for autocorrelation of the residuals is conducted by using the Ljung-
Box Q test.  
If either one of the TAR and the M-TAR models or both models assure that the null 
hypotheses of symmetric price adjustment (𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2) are rejected, the asymmetric ECM 
can be specified as following form: 
Δ𝑃𝑡
𝐴 = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
Δ𝑃𝑡−𝑖
𝐴 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
Δ𝑃𝑡−𝑗
𝐵 +𝑎2𝜀?̂?−1
+ + 𝑎3𝜀?̂?−1
− + 𝜇𝑡      (1.9) 
where 𝜀?̂?−1
+  and 𝜀?̂?−1
−  represent the positive and negative deviations to equilibrium created 
by change in 𝑃𝑡
𝐵.  
The calculation of how many months are required to adjust under a proportion of 
probability (𝑝) of the disequilibrium is made by the following formula presented in the 
study by Ghoshray (2002): 
n =
log (1 − 𝑝)
log (1 − 𝑎𝑖)
      (1.10) 
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where n stands for the number of months, p is a proportional probability of the 
disequilibrium to be restored, and 𝑎𝑖, where (i = 1,2,3) is the short-run adjustment rate to 
the long-run equilibrium from Equation (1.8) and (1.9).  
1.4. Data   
A series of tests mentioned above are conducted by using the following price series: 
Australian beef export price (AUS), United States beef export price (US), Untied States 
utility cow price (USUC), New Zealand beef export price (NZ), Canadian beef export price 
(CAN), and Japanese wholesale carcass price (JAN). All series used for the analysis are 
monthly averages and quoted in nominal United States Dollars (USD). All prices are 
expressed in the logarithm in the regressions used in this research.  
Table 1.1. Basic statistical measures of the price series for each country 
  AUS US USUC NZ CAN JAN 
Type 
Fresh 
/frozen 
Fresh 
/frozen 
Carcass 
Fresh 
/frozen 
Fresh 
/frozen 
Carcass 
# of obs 252 142 228 252 148 252 
Time span 
Jan 1995 - 
Dec 2015 
Mar 2004 - 
Dec 2015 
Jan 1997 - 
Dec 2015 
Jan 1995 - 
Dec 2015 
Sept 2003 - 
Dec 2015 
Jan 1995 - 
Dec 2015 
Max 6.44 6.50 117.29 5.96 2.67 22.86 
Min 1.95 2.20 27.77 1.77 7.42 9.80 
Mean 3.59 4.09 56.45 3.22 3.95 17.89 
SD 1.19 1.14 20.37 1.11 0.95 2.31 
Variance 1.41 1.30 414.76 1.24 0.90 5.35 
Skewness 0.26 0.50 1.30 0.54 1.18 -0.74 
Kurtosis -1.24 -0.86 1.09 -0.98 1.12 0.89 
The sources of the data are as following; AUS (Meat & livestock Australia), US (USDA/FAS), 
USUC (USDA/AMS), NZ (Statistics New Zealand), CAN (Canadian International Merchandise 
Trade Database), and JAN (Agriculture & Livestock Industries Corporation).  
 
For type of beef, the AUS, US, NZ and CAN prices are characterized as bovine 
meat of both born-in cuts and cuts with born left in for chilled/fresh and frozen. The export 
prices for these countries are calculated as monthly average values per kilogram (kg) using 
the aggregated export values divided by the aggregated export quantities for these cuts. In 
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addition, the type of the USUC is slaughter cows in Sioux Falls, SD (grade=boners 80, 85 
and weight=800-1,200), its price is monthly average per pound. The JAN are average price 
for carcass by grade for Wagyu cow/heifers A-5~A-3 and Wagyu steers A-5~A-2. 
Descriptive statistics, characteristics and sources of each price are reported in Table 1-1. 
Figure 1.1. Comparison of price series by country in the TPP countries 
One concern of applying the co-integration test using the US and CAN data series 
is the occurrence of the BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy)5 in each full sample 
period because the BSE outbreak may affect parameter stability. The date of the BSE 
outbreak can be considered as a possible breakpoint, and a test for a structural break in the 
series conducted and if necessary correct the series in an appropriate way in order to 
improve the co-integration test. 
5 There have been four cases of the BSE identified in the United States; Dec 2003, June 2005, 
Mar 2006, and Apr 2012, and in Canada, the BSE has arisen on May 2003.  
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For this purpose, identifying extreme observations in the US and the CAN series is 
needed. All price series tend to move together over time except for some points in the US 
and the CAN series as shown in Figure 1. Initially, although 10 extreme observations in 
each full sample period are found as the potential breakpoints, more than half are close to 
the end of the data series. Others that are close to the first part of the series appear to 
normally move in a falling trend. With consideration for pre and post BSE outbreak in the 
two series, two breakpoints of each series are selected: the potential breakpoints in the US 
series are months 109 and 110 corresponding to January 2004 and February 2004 
respectively, in the CAN series months 102 and 104 corresponding to June 2003 and 
August 2003 are chosen. These breakpoints are almost consistent with the occurrence of 
BSE in the United States and Canada. Based on this, a test for a structural break in a model 
for regressing the US and the CAN of each on another price would be appropriate. 
The Chow test6 to these observations is conducted to test for the hypothesis of no 
structural break over the entire time period. The results of the structural change test for the 
US and the CAN are reported in Table 2. For the US, the Chow test has highly significant 
break points in months 109 and 110, which correspond to the time points January 2004 and 
February 2004, and for the CAN, the null hypothesis of no structural break with the break 
points 102 and 104 corresponding to June 2003 and August 2003 is rejected at significance 
level of 5 percent, except for breakpoint 102 in the regression with the NZ price. These 
6 It is noted that the Chow test in this study is based on a model in the log-levels of non-stationary 
prices, which implies the estimators of the model parameters are super consistent. However, since 
the Chow test statistic does not generally have the usual null distribution due to possibility of a lack 
of usual sampling properties test results may not be fully correct about the potential for BSE impacts 
of the data.  
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tests allow for the conclusion that there might be sufficient evidence in support of structural 
change in the series of for the US and CAN prices. Given that there was a long period of 
available data, both the US and the CAN series are restricted to use only the data after the 
breakpoint 110 for the US and 104 for the CAN. The remaindering 142 observations for 
the US and 148 observations for CAN are used in this study.   
Table 1.2.  Structural change test for the US and the CAN 
Dependent variable: US 
Break point AUS CAN NZ JAP 
109 (Jan-04) 85.12 (0.00) 132.82 (0.00) 132.12 (0.00) 13.79 (0.00) 
110 (Feb-04) 81.61 (0.00) 144.47 (0.00) 127.60 (0.00) 16.43 (0.00) 
Dependent variable: CAN 
Break point AUS US NZ JAP 
102 (Jun-03) 6.27 (0.00) 137.69 (0.00) 1.07 (0.34) 86.09  (0.00) 
104 (Aug-03) 6.22 (0.00) 100.83 (0.00) 3.92 (0.02) 67.20 (0.00) 
Notes: F-statistic is reported for each break point and p-value is stated in parenthesis.  
1.5. Empirical results 
1.5.1. Stationary test for the series 
Before estimating the model, the prices should be determined for the order of 
integration. To do this, the ADF, PP, and KPSS tests are conducted to check for the 
presence of the unit root in the price series. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 present the results of the 
stationary tests for each of the price series in logged levels and the logged first difference 
levels, respectively. The ADF and PP procedure test for the null hypothesis that the price 
series has a unit root, while the KPSS is conducted to test for the null hypothesis that the 
series does not have a unit root. The SBC would be helpful to choose the appropriate length 
of lags for each test.  
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Table 1.3. Results of stationary tests in logged levels for each country 
AUS US USUC CAN NZ JAP 
ADF 
Drift -0.46 -1.38 -1.00 -0.93 -0.74 -2.51 
Drift & 
trend 
-2.94 -2.62 -2.43 -2.59 -4.76** -3.45* 
PP 
Drift -1.37 -1.84 -1.34 -1.15 -0.70 -2.54 
Drift & 
trend 
-6.41** -5.26** -2.85 -3.10 -4.12** -3.51** 
KPSS 
Drift 3.91** 3.55** 3.28** 5.00** 7.98** 5.02** 
Trend 0.28** 1.09** 0.40** 1.48** 0.40** 0.55** 
Lag length 5 4 4 1 2 1 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. The critical value of ADF 
and PP tests at 5% and 10% significance level are obtained from the R. Davidson and J.G. 
Mackinnon (1993), Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. The critical values of test with a 
drift and with a drift and a trend for ADF and PP tests at 5% significant are -2.86 and -3.41, 
respectively and at 10% significant are -2.57 and -3.13, respectively. For the KPSS tests, the critical 
values with a drift and with a trend at 5% significant are 0.463 and 0.146, respectively and at 10% 
significant are 0.347 and 0.119, respectively.  
Table 1.4. Results of stationary tests in the logged first difference for each country 
AUS US USUC CAN NZ JAP 
ADF 
Drift -12.95** -10.42** -8.55** -7.77** -10.20** -11.75** 
Drift & 
trend 
-12.97** -10.44** -8.54** -7.75** -10.20** -11.77** 
PP 
Drift -33.05** -18.37** -11.70** -13.12** -13.17** -15.83** 
Drift & 
trend 
-33.05** -18.45** -11.69** -13.13** -13.16** -15.82** 
KPSS 
Drift 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.06 
Trend 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.03 
Lag length 2 3 1 1 1 1 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. The critical value of ADF 
and PP tests at 5% and 10% significance level are obtained from the R. Davidson and J.G. 
Mackinnon (1993), Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. The critical values of test with a 
drift and with a drift and a trend for ADF and PP tests at 5% significant are -2.86 and -3.41, 
respectively and at 10% significant are -2.57 and -3.13, respectively. For the KPSS tests, the critical 
values with a drift and with a trend at 5% significant are 0.463 and 0.146, respectively and at 10% 
significant are 0.347 and 0.119, respectively.  
The results in Table 1.3 show that there is sufficient evidence of a unit root for all 
price series in levels, implying that it is necessary to take the first difference in order to 
assure stationarity of these series. On the basis of the results in Table 1.4, on the other hand, 
all three tests confirm that all the first differenced series do not have the unit root. The 
conclusion is that all price series analyzed are type I (1), which implies that this result is 
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allowed to perform the tests for co-integration on all the series using the Johansen ML test, 
the Engle-Granger co-integration test and threshold co-integration test for the pairs of 
series. 
1.5.2. Co-integration test under symmetric adjustment 
The initial step in the Johansen approach is to select an appropriate lag length for 
each series by using the BIC. The length of lag is equal to one for the TPP countries. The 
results of the Johansen ML co-integration rank test using trace for the TPP countries are 
shown in Table 1.5. The null hypotheses of no co-integrating relationship (𝐻0: r = 0), one 
co-integrating relationship (𝐻0: r = 1), two co-integrating relationships (𝐻0: r = 2) should 
be rejected at the significance level of 5 percent, and the null hypotheses of three co-
integrating relationships (𝐻0: r = 3) should be rejected, while the null hypotheses  r = 3 
or 4 are rejected at the 10 percent significance level. On the other hand, the null hypotheses 
of five co-integrating relationship (𝐻0: r = 5) is not rejected. This comes to a conclusion 
that there might be five long-run equilibrium relationships for the six price.  
Table 1.5. Johansen co-integration rank test using the trace for the TPP countries 
𝐻0: 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 = 𝑟 𝐻1: 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 > 𝑟 Trace 
0 0 216.76 (0.00) 
1 1 93.55 (0.00) 
2 2 56.39 (0.01) 
3 3 27.11 (0.09) 
4 4 13.71 (0.09) 
5 5 1.16 (0.28) 
Note: The p-values are presented in parenthesis. The 𝑟 is the number of co-integration relationships.  
 
Next, Johansen and Engle-Granger co-integrating tests are conducted to identify 
which pairs of series are co-integrated. In the TPP countries, Australia, New Zealand, 
United States, and Canada are major beef exporters, and Japan and United States are major 
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beef importers. Over half of the beef supply for Japan relies on imports, which primarily 
come from Australia and the United States, with Canada and New Zealand as secondary 
suppliers. The top three beef exporting countries to the United States are Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada, accounting for 30.5%, 21.4%, and 24.6%, respectively. Canada also 
imports beef from the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, with fresh beef largely 
coming from the United States, while frozen beef is mainly sourced from Australia and 
New Zealand. In light of a trade relationship of these countries, the combinations of pairs 
of series for testing co-integration are made by allowing for the main role of each countries 
in beef trade within the TPP.   
Table 1.6. Johansen co-integration for each pairs of series for the TPP countries 
No. of lags 𝐻0: 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 = 𝑟 𝐻1: 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 > 𝑟 Trace 
USUC – AUS 3 
0 0 16.77 (0.03) 
1 1 0.89 (0.35) 
CAN – AUS 2 
0 0 35.65 (0.00) 
1 1 0.89 (0.35) 
NZ – AUS 4 
0 0 13.90 (0.09) 
1 1 0.31 (0.58) 
JAP – AUS 3 
0 0 16.39 (0.04) 
1 1 0.17 (0.68) 
USUC – CAN 1 
0 0 30.37 (0.00) 
1 1 1.10 (0.29) 
USUC – NZ 2 
0 0 19.12 (0.01) 
1 1 1.53 (0.22) 
JAP – US 1 
0 0 20.09 (0.01) 
1 1 3.86 (0.05) 
CAN – US 1 
0 0 16.08 (0.04) 
1 1 1.12 (0.29) 
CAN – NZ 2 
0 0 26.69 (0.00) 
1 1 1.23 (0.27) 
JAP – CAN 2 
0 0 20.04 (0.01) 
1 1 0.80 (0.37) 
JAP – NZ 1 
0 0 14.54 (0.07) 
1 1 0.26 (0.61) 
Note: The p-values are presented in parenthesis. The 𝑟 represents the number of co-integrating 
relationship.  
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As shown in table 1.6, the null hypotheses of one co-integrating relationship 
(𝐻0: r = 1) is not rejected in all cases. This indicates that there are long-run relationships 
in each price relationship. According to the results of the Engle-Granger co-integrating 
tests, ADF and PP test results support that all combinations of pairs of price series are co-
integrated, while KPSS test results suggest that there is insufficient evidence for co-
integrating relationship between all pairs of price series (Table 1.7). However, since the 
existence of co-integrating relationship is confirmed by two (ADF and PP test) of the three 
test results, as well as the results of Johansen ML pairwise co-integration test, which is 
more robust for the test of co-integration, it shows that all pairs of price series are co-
integrated (Table 1.6). On that basis, it is reasonable to conclude that the beef market in 
the TPP countries is a highly-integrated market. This implies that there a long-run 
equilibrium relationship of each pairwise of prices.     
Table 1.7. Results of Engle-Granger co-integration test for the TPP countries 
 Lag 𝛽1 
ADF PP KPSS 
Drift 
Drift & 
trend 
Drift 
Drift & 
trend 
Drift Trend 
USUC–AUS 1 0.83 (26.04)** -3.97** -3.98** -4.66** -4.68** 1.57** 1.46** 
CAN–AUS 3 0.92 (13.47)** -2.66* -3.20* -5.13** -5.51** 0.91** 0.73** 
NZ–AUS 3 0.96 (58.21)** -3.85** -3.83** -11.72** -11.70** 0.53** 0.55** 
JAP–AUS 4 0.29 (15.14)** -4.76** -4.68** -4.43** -4.40** 0.18 0.17** 
USUC–CAN 3 1.18 (28.35)** -5.57** -5.91** -5.44** -5.44** 0.82** 0.23** 
USUC–NZ 2 0.89 (35.04)** -4.74** -4.72** -4.34** -4.32** 0.74** 0.75** 
JAP–US 1 0.01 (0.30) -4.27** -4.30** -4.25** -4.27** 0.34 0.24** 
CAN–US 1 0.66 (18.62) ** -2.86** -2.82** -3.10** -3.06** 1.34** 1.36** 
CAN–NZ 1 0.81 (17.23) ** -3.50** -3.55** -4.33** -4.34** 1.38** 1.38** 
JAP–CAN 1 0.01 (0.31) -4.44** -4.48** -4.65** -4.68** 0.42* 0.23** 
JAP–NZ 1 0.26 (12.58) ** -3.85** -3.83** -3.81** -3.78** 0.44* 0.48** 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. The critical value of ADF 
and PP tests at 5% and 10% significance level are obtained from the R. Davidson and J.G. 
Mackinnon (1993), Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. The critical values of test with a 
drift and with a drift and a trend for ADF and PP tests at 5% significant are -2.86 and -3.41, 
respectively and at 10% significant are -2.57 and -3.13, respectively. For the KPSS tests, the critical 
values with a drift and with a trend at 5% significant are 0.463 and 0.146, respectively and at 10% 
significant are 0.347 and 0.119, respectively.  
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There are some reasons regarding the results, which first exclude the time point that 
the BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) has occurred in the series of both Canada 
and United States may greatly contribute to improving the results of co-integration test. In 
initial analysis of the full sample periods, including the time point which BSE occurs that 
could result in the possible structural break, were used to examine the presence of co-
integration. Consequently, the results were that no price series are co-integrated with 
Canadian beef exporting prices. Furthermore, the null of no co-integration failed to reject 
between the U.S beef exporting prices and Australian beef exporting prices. Therefore, the 
BSE in beef trade can be considered as one of the key factors that hinder the linkage of 
prices between spatially separated markets. Second, the lack of the presence of co-
integration between two prices might attribute to the quality difference of beef that results 
from feeding regimes (grass-fed beef vs grain-fed beef). In this sense, the U.S. utility cow 
price is well co-integrated with the beef prices of the major exporting countries because 
domestic cull cows and lean beef imports sourced from Australia, New Zealand, and 
Canada are similar in end-use for making ground beef in the U.S. In fact, in the preliminary 
co-integration test between steer prices and two grades of beef prices (choice and select) 
of the United States and the exporting price of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, there 
is lack of evidence to conclude there is co-integration between them. This might be a result 
of the quality difference and different end-use between high-graded beef of the U.S. and 
imported beef. Finally, the theory of the LOP implicitly supports that co-moving price 
relations over time are sufficient to establish a strong presumption that the products should 
be in the same market (Diakosavvas, 1995). In this sense, it makes sense to make a 
conclusion for well co-integration among these countries in beef trade because these 
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countries have historically traded in beef that consists of both the highest conditioned cuts 
and manufacturing beef for a long period of time within both the Pacific market as the 
major trade center and each market in bilateral trade.  
The parameter 𝛽1 of Equation (1.1) measuring a long run equilibrium relationship 
between pairs of price series is considered as the price transmission elasticity, meaning that 
the percentage change in the price of one country given a 1% change in the price of another 
country. More than half of the values of 𝛽1’s are very close to one, in most cases with a 
range from 0.66 to 1.18, and statistically significant different from zero at the 5% 
significance level. However, the values of 𝛽1’s between the prices of Japan and the prices 
of other countries are extremely low and statistically insignificant at the significance level 
of 5%. This is likely related to trade liberalization (Goychuk and Meyers, 2014), i.e., the 
more the levels of free trade are intensified, the greater price transmission elasticities are 
likely to have, while the high trade barriers may insulate the domestic markets and impede 
the full transmission of the price signals of other countries.  
1.5.3. Estimates of threshold co-integration and asymmetry price transmission 
Next, by using the Heaviside Indicator function from Equation (1.5) ~ (1.6), 
threshold co-integration and asymmetric price adjustment are tested. The Ljung-Box test 
is conducted to see if the residuals are serially correlated in the TAR and the M-TAR model. 
The length of lags for the lagged first differences of ∆𝜀?̂? is selected by using the SBC as 
shown in Table 1.8.  
The main results are as follows: first, coefficients of both 𝛾1 and 𝛾2represent a 
positive adjustment rate and a negative adjustment rate into the long run equilibrium 
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respectively. As shown in Table 1.8, these coefficients of both the TAR model and the M-
TAR model are significant at the 5% level in most of the cases. However, the estimates of 
𝛾2 for the CAN-US of both models are not significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
Furthermore, the estimate of 𝛾2for the JAP-NZ in the M-TAR model and that of 𝛾1 for the 
CAN-AUS in the TAR model are insignificant at the 5% level.  
Second, for both models, rate of adjustment for the negative deviation from long-
run equilibrium tends to occur more quickly than that for the positive deviation in beef 
trade among the TPP countries. To interpret the estimate of 𝛾1 and 𝛾2, for example, in the 
case of the USUC-AUS in the TAR model, the estimate of 𝛾1 (-0.11) indicates that 11% of 
the positive discrepancy from the long-run equilibrium is eliminated within a month, and 
the estimate of 𝛾2 (-0.30) represents that 30% of the negative discrepancy from the long-
run equilibrium is eliminated within a month. Similarly, 𝛾1 (-0.10) and 𝛾2 (-0.25) for the 
USUS-AUS in the M-TAR model indicate that 10 percent of the positive deviation and 25 
percent of the negative deviation from the long-run equilibrium are eliminated within a 
month respectively. Interpretation of 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 for other cases can be applied in the same 
manner as stated in the above examples.  
Finally, the test results indicate that the null hypothesis that residuals are 
uncorrelated cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level for all cases, which implies 
that the models estimated are marked by a white noise process of residuals. The null 
hypothesis of no co-integration ( 𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 ) is tested by using the 𝛷 -statistic 
estimated as compared to the critical values provided by Enders and Granger (1998). If  the 
𝛷-statistic is greater than the critical values at each significance level reported in Table 6, 
the pairs of price are co-integrated. The results of both TAR and M-TAR model show that 
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the null hypothesis of no co-integration is rejected in all cases of the pairs of price series. 
The F-statistic is used to test the null hypothesis of symmetric price adjustment (𝐻0: 𝛾1 =
𝛾2). If either the TAR or the M-TAR models cannot support the evidence in support of 
symmetric price adjustment, the co-integrated pairs of price are regarded as an asymmetric 
price adjustment. In the TAR model, symmetric price adjustment for almost all of the pairs 
of prices is confirmed due to no rejection of the null, except for the USUC-AUS and the 
JAP-AUS price pairs. However, the M-TAR model assures that the null hypothesis of 
symmetric price transmission is rejected in most of the pairs of price series except for the 
USUC-CAN and the CAN-NZ price pairs.  
In short, the conclusion can be reached that both the USUS-CAN and the CAN-NZ 
price pairs are symmetric price adjustment, indicating there is lack of evidence for 
threshold adjustment of two cases, while all remaining pairs of price series adjust 
asymmetrically, which imply there is the presence of threshold adjustment of these pairs 
of prices.  
Table 1.8. Results of the TAR model and the M-TAR model for the TPP countries 
lags 𝛾1
𝑎 𝛾2
𝑏 𝐻0
1: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0
𝑐 𝐻0
2: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2
𝑑 τ 𝑄(6) 𝐹𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
TAR 
USUC – AUS 0 -0.11 [-2.18]** -0.30 [-5.08]** 15.26** 5.90 (0.02) -0.042 9.36 (0.15) 15.26 (0.00) 
CAN – AUS 1 -0.17 [-2.41]** -0.26 [-3.42]** 8.57** 0.82 (0.37) -0.032 3.19 (0.79) 17.77 (0.00) 
NZ – AUS 3 -0.24 [-2.94]** -0.36 [-3.46]** 7.88** 1.11 (0.29) -0.043 7.90 (0.25) 45.23 (0.00) 
JAP – AUS 3 -0.27 [-4.43]** -0.13 [-3.48]** 14.65** 3.66 (0.06) 0.024 1.69 (0.95) 10.09 (0.00) 
USUC – CAN 2 -0.30 [-3.39]** -0.37 [-4.76]** 15.58** 0.45 (0.50) 0.024 4.09 (0.66) 8.25 (0.00) 
USUC – NZ 2 -0.11 [-2.78]** -0.21 [-4.34]** 12.58** 2.48 (0.12) -0.017 3.49 (0.75) 7.52 (0.00) 
JAP – US 0 -0.16 [-2.27]** -0.34 [-3.75]** 9.63** 2.30 (0.13) -0.017 4.55 (0.60) 9.63 (0.00) 
CAN – US 1 -0.14 [-2.59]** -0.08 [-1.49] 4.37* 0.59 (0.44) 0.008 4.16 (0.65) 9.43 (0.00) 
CAN – NZ 0 -0.20 [-4.18]** -0.10 [-1.87]* 10.48** 1.86 (0.18) 0.012 5.63 (0.47) 10.48 (0.00) 
JAP – CAN 0 -0.18 [-2.49]** -0.37 [-4.15]** 11.71** 2.81 (0.10) -0.016 3.75 (0.71) 11.71 (0.00) 
JAP – NZ 0 -0.16 [-3.27]** -0.08 [-2.21]** 7.80** 1.92 (0.17) 0.0186 8.40 (0.21) 7.80 (0.01) 
M -TAR 
USUC – AUS 1 -0.10 [-2.08]** -0.25 [-4.00]** 9.80** 3.55 (0.06) -0.012 7.08 (0.31) 11.08 (0.00) 
CAN – AUS 2 -0.08 [-1.30] -0.40 [-4.25]** 9.65** 8.41 (0.00) -0.038 0.16 (0.98) 16.27 (0.00) 
NZ – AUS 3 -0.24 [-3.19]** -0.45 [-3.64]** 8.80** 2.85 (0.09) -0.044 8.06 (0.23) 42.88 (0.00) 
JAP – AUS 3 -0.09 [-1.90]* -0.23 [-5.27]** 15.04** 4.38 (0.04) 0.002 2.47 (0.87) 10.26 (0.00) 
USUC – CAN 2 -0.24 [-2.64]** -0.40 [-5.29]** 16.44** 1.86 (0.18) 0.009 4.21 (0.65) 8.69 (0.00) 
USUC – NZ 2 -0.09 [-2.55]** -0.30 [-5.24]** 16.34** 9.30 (0.00) -0.011 4.34 (0.63) 9.43 (0.00) 
JAP – US 0 -0.13 [-1.79]* -0.36 [-4.19]** 10.36** 3.95 (0.05) -0.002 5.08 (0.53) 10.36 (0.00) 
CAN – US 1 -0.14 [-3.36)]** 0.08 [0.76] 5.99** 3.66 (0.06) -0.021 4.44 (0.62) 10.66 (0.00) 
CAN – NZ 0 -0.24 [-3.35]** -0.10 [-2.25]** 8.16** 2.73 (0.10) 0.010 6.53 (0.37) 8.16 (0.00) 
JAP – CAN 0 -0.15 [-2.06]** -0.36 [-4.23]** 11.06** 3.53 (0.06) -0.001 4.78 (0.57) 11.06 (0.00) 
JAP – NZ 0 -0.14 [-4.27]** -0.004 [-0.08] 9.11** 4.75 (0.03) -0.017 7.52 (0.28) 9.11 (0.00) 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. The lags stand for the length of lags of the lagged first differences 
of the dependent variable to correct for the autocorrelation in the error term 𝜔𝑡 of equation (4). a and b coefficients and 𝑡-statistics in bracket
for the null hypothesis 𝛾1 = 0 and 𝛾2 = 0, respectively, which denote the coefficients of adjustment. c Sample values of 𝛷-statistic of the
TAR model and the M-TAR model with n = 250  for the null hypothesis 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0  at 10% significance level are 3.74 and 4.05
respectively and at 5% significance level are 4.56 and 4.96 respectively. For n = 100, sample values of 𝛷-statistic of the TAR model and 
the M-TAR model for the null hypothesis 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 at 10% significance level are 3.79 and 4.11 respectively and at 5% significance level
are 4.64 and 5.02 respectively. These critical values are computed by Enders and Granger (1998). d Sample F-statistic for the null hypothesis 
𝛾1 = 𝛾2 and p-values are stated in parenthesis The p-values are stated in parenthesis for the Ljung-Box Q-statistic and F-statistic.  
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1.5.4. Estimates of error correction models 
This section mainly focuses on identifying the short-run adjustment speed to 
temporary shock and a role of price leadership among the countries in their beef trade. 
Basically, the coefficient of error correction term represents change in the dependent 
variable in response to temporary shocks to the deviations from a long-run steady state 
(Awokuse and Wang, 2009). Moreover, in the interpretation, it can provide useful 
information in two aspects, one is on which a country is a price leader (Goychuk and 
Meyers, 2014) or the second, on the direction of Granger causality (Rapsomanikis et.al., 
2006) between two prices by testing the null hypothesis that the error correction terms are 
equal to zero. This paper follows the former’s perspective when interpreting the results of 
that. Given the findings of the co-integration test (Engle-Granger and Johansen test) and 
that of tests for threshold co-integration and symmetry price transmission mentioned above, 
their short-run dynamics is estimated using the standard ECM of Equation (1.8). However, 
if two prices are co-integrated but do not have symmetric price adjustment, asymmetric 
ECM can be used by adding a positive shock (𝜀?̂?−1
+ ) and a negative shock (𝜀?̂?−1
− ) into its 
specification in the form of Equation (1.9).  
To conserve space, only coefficients of the error correction terms are represented 
in Tables 1.9 and 1.10. The SBC is employed to select the length of lags to make sure that 
the residuals of 𝜇𝑡 have a white noise process. The determined lag lengths for each model 
are shown in Tables 1.9 and 1.10. With regard to this, the Ljung-Box test shows that the 
null hypothesis that residuals are not serially correlated cannot be rejected, implying the 
residuals of each model follow a white noise process.  
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Table 1.9. Estimates of asymmetric error correction models for the TPP countries  
Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable 
lags 
ECT 
𝑄(6) 𝐹𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 
𝜀?̂?−1
+  𝜀?̂?−1
−  
USUC AUS 1;1 0.03 [0.43] -0.22 [-4.83]** 10.63 (0.10) 11.15 (0.00) 
AUS USUC 2;2 -0.09 [-1.27] -0.05 [-0.78] 2.67 (0.85) 22.72 (0.00) 
 CAN AUS 1;1 -0.07 [-1.42] -0.09 [-1.47] 6.86 (0.33) 2.79 (0.03) 
AUS CAN 1;1 -0.42 [-3.10]** -0.22 [-1.99]* 8.86 (0.18) 19.10 (0.00) 
NZ AUS 1;1 -0.17 [-3.05]** 0.01 [0.22] 3.12 (0.61) 4.69 (0.00) 
AUS NZ 3;3 -0.36 [-2.94]** -0.06 [-0.52] 4.14 (0.66) 32.56 (0.00) 
JAP AUS 1;1 -0.23 [-3.28]** -0.06 [-1.40] 6.09 (0.41) 4.99 (0.00) 
AUS JAP 2;2 -0.07 [-1.69]* 0.03 [0.71] 3.53 (0.74) 30.93 (0.00) 
USUC NZ 2;2 -0.03 [0.50] -0.21 [-3.35]** 1.73 (0.94) 7.12 (0.00) 
NZ USUC 1;1 -0.05 [-1.11] -0.06 [-1.51] 4.65 (0.59) 7.22 (0.00) 
JAP US 1;1 -0.16 [-1.63] -0.41 [-3.24]** 5.93 (0.43) 5.95 (0.00) 
US JAP 1;1 0.02 [0.55] -0.09 [2.16]** 8.24 (0.22) 6.76 (0.00) 
CAN US 1;1 -0.10 [-1.52] -0.02 [-0.27] 10.06 (0.12) 1.53 (0.20) 
US CAN 1;1 -0.13 [-1.50] -0.07 [-1.56] 8.12 (0.23) 8.95 (0.00) 
JAP CAN 1;1 -0.17 [-1.68] -0.42 [-3.24]** 3.89 (0.69) 5.46 (0.00) 
CAN JAP 1;1 0.02 [0.61] -0.08 [-1.55] 7.61 (0.27) 1.04 (0.39) 
JAP NZ 1;1 -0.20 [-3.12]** -0.05 [-1.37] 10.10 (0.12) 4.58 (0.00) 
NZ JAP 1;1 -0.03 [-1.81]* 0.02 [0.86] 7.27 (0.30) 3.79 (0.01) 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively.The 𝑡-statistics in bracket 
for the coefficients of a positive and a negative error correction terms. The p-values are stated in 
parenthesis for the Ljung-Box Q-statistic and F-statistic.  
 
Table 1.10. Estimates of symmetric error correction models for the TPP counties  
Dependent variable Independent variable lags 𝜀?̂?−1 𝑄(6) 𝐹𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 
USUC CAN 1;1 -0.17 [-3.50]** 4.18 (0.65) 7.43 (0.00) 
CAN USUC 2;2 -0.19 [-3.69]** 6.60 (0.36) 5.43 (0.00) 
 CAN NZ 1;1 -0.11 [-3.65]** 7.46 (0.28) 6.77 (0.00) 
NZ CAN 1;1 -0.06 [-2.43]** 7.80 (0.31) 8.06 (0.00) 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. The 𝑡-statistics in bracket 
for the coefficients of error correction terms. The p-values are stated in parenthesis for the Ljung-
Box Q-statistic and F-statistic.  
 
The main findings are that the response of the USUC to negative shocks for both 
the AUS and the NZ are significantly different from zero at the significance level of 5% 
but not vice versa. This indicates that the USUC unidirectionally adjusts to the long-run 
equilibrium to change in both the AUS and the NZ in each relationship. Therefore, there is 
empirical evidence that Australia and New Zealand can be considered as a price leader in 
each bilateral trade relation. Leading the prices by Australia and New Zealand in beef trade 
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with the United States is not surprising because Australia and New Zealand supply the 
largest volume of beef to the United States. In fact, the share of the two countries 
(approximately on average 30.5 percent for Australia, and about on average 21.4 percent 
for New Zealand in 2011~2015, respectively) is more than half of U.S. imported beef. To 
interpret the coefficients of the error correction terms, they show in the case of the 
relationships between the United States and Australia, approximately 22 percent of 
adjustment occurs to negative shock in the long-run disequilibrium created by an increase 
in the AUS. By using Equation (1.10) the adjustment of the USUC to correct given 90 
percent of disequilibrium to a negative shock would take about 9 months after the change 
in the AUS. Similarly, the USUC adjusts to correct about 21 percent of negative deviation 
from the long-run USUC-NZ relationship generated by an increase in the NZ. This also 
suggests that it takes the USUC approximately 10 months to correct toward the equilibrium 
after an increase in the NZ.  
In the case of Japan, the JAP has a significant response at the 5% significance level 
to only positive price shocks in the long-run relationships between both the AUS and the 
NZ with the adjustment rate of approximately 23 percent (equivalently about 9 months) 
and 20 percent (equivalently about 10 months) respectively. In the relationships between 
Japan and both the United States and Canada, on the other hand, the responses of the JAP 
to only negative price shocks are significant at a significance level of 5%, which indicates 
the adjustment rates are about 41 percent (equivalently about 4 months) to negative shocks 
of the US and 42 percent (equivalently about 4 months) to negative shocks of CAN, 
respectively. This implies that the JAP responds much more quickly to correct the deviation 
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from the long-run equilibrium created by negative shocks of both the US and the CAN than 
positive shocks of both the AUS and the NZ.  
Meanwhile, positive error correction terms (ETCs), 𝜀?̂?−1
+  are significant at 10% 
level for both AUS and NZ in the error correction equation of AUS-JAP and NZ-JAP. The 
conclusion can be reached that neither country lead the price in each relationship of 
between Japan and Australia or between Japan and New Zealand. However, each 
adjustment duration for AUS and NZ to positive shocks of JAP is approximately 34 months 
and 72 months, respectively, and is much more persistent than the case of opposite 
directions in error correction equations such as JAP-AUS and JAP-NZ. In addition, since 
the response of the US to positive shocks of JAP is also significant at the 5% significance 
level there is no price leader in the relationship with the United States and Japan. For the 
US, the adjustment duration is also much more persistent to positive shocks of JAP than 
that of the JAP to positive shocks of the US. However, in the case of the relationship 
between Japan and Canada, Canada can lead the price because the response of the CAN to 
positive shocks of JAP is not significant at the 5% significance level.  
The responses of the AUS to both positive and negative shocks of the CAN are 
significant at the significance level of 5%, but not vice versa. It suggests that Canada is 
regarded as a price leader in its relationship. Furthermore, the adjustment of the AUS to 
positive and negative shocks are approximately 42 percent and 22 percent respectively. 
This indicates that AUS tends to adjust quickly to long-run equilibrium to positive shock 
created by decrease in CAN while for negative shock created by the CAN, adjustment of 
the AUS tends to persist. In the case of the relationship between Australia and New Zealand, 
the only positive error correction terms in error correction equation of both NZ-AUS (about 
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17 percent) and AUS-NZ (about 36 percent) are significantly different from zero at the 5% 
significance level. Since the relation of price leadership for these two countries is 
bidirectional, it cannot state either country is viewed as a price leader.  
For the case of symmetric adjustment, in the case of the relationship between NZ 
and CAN, approximately 6-11 percent of correction in long-run equilibrium occurs 
bidirectionally in a month. This can reach a conclusion that either country cannot be 
considered as a price leader in its price relationship. Similarly, in the case of between the 
USUC and the CAN, the ETCs of error correction equations of both the USUC-CAN and 
the CAN-USUC are significantly different from zero. It means that either country exerts a 
price leadership. Meanwhile, each price reverts back toward the long-run equilibrium after 
change in another price within about 11 months.  
Although it is difficult to conclude which factors do primarily result in the 
asymmetric price adjustment, the previous literature has highlighted that policy 
intervention, the number of marketing channels, product differentiation and quality 
difference of goods, contract arrangement between agents, stock holding behavior, and 
delays due to transportation can be generally taken into consideration as factors that cause 
an asymmetric adjustment (Rapsomanikis et.al., 2006; Diakosavvas, 1995). With careful 
suggestions, asymmetric price adjustment may be due to the quality differences, different 
end-use of beef, imperfect competition, and trade policy in the TPP countries. For example, 
in the case of the Japanese beef market, well-marbled wagyu beef is generally regarded as 
higher quality with a higher premium than the imported beef sourced from Australia, New 
Zealand, United States, and Canada. Moreover, due to the relatively better geographical 
advantage of Oceania exporters rather than North American countries, Australia and New 
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Zealand are more likely to export the fresh/chilled beef, which may compete with the 
fresh/chilled beef produced in the Japanese domestic market. The United States and Canada, 
on the other hand, have largely supplied the frozen beef for the demand of the fast food 
industry (Obara et al., 2010). Given that Japanese domestic beef is generally perceived as 
higher quality than the imported frozen beef, it is possible to conjecture that an increase in 
the US or the CAN may result in a quick response of the JAP, while the JAP may be 
adjusted at a much slower rate to a decrease in the US or the CAN because Japanese 
domestic beef has a premium for high quality. Furthermore, a decrease in the AUS or the 
NZ may lead to a swift response of the JAP because wholesalers or processors try to 
maintain their market share for fresh/chilled beef produced in the domestic market against 
relatively lower prices of imported fresh/chilled beef. Further studies in this field are 
needed to investigate the exact causes resulting in an asymmetric pattern of price 
adjustment in world beef trade. Especially, empirical study on investigating the link 
between main causes cited above and asymmetric price adjustment would be worth in the 
field of research. 
1.6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates market integration and spatial price transmission in beef 
trade among the TPP countries by using monthly price series. The estimates of the 
magnitude and the short-run speed of adjustment for one price to the shocks of another 
between two countries would be useful information in assessing how well change in one 
price is transmitted to another, what type of price transmission (symmetrical or 
asymmetrical) occurs in beef trade associated with the existence of potential market 
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inefficiencies resulted from asymmetric pattern of adjustment, and further in defining 
which country can lead price change. 
On the basis of the results of the Engle-Granger and Johansen co-integration tests, 
the TPP countries are a highly co-integrated market in beef trade. This suggests that there 
is a long-run equilibrium relationship between pairs of price series and the various types of 
beef traded by the TPP countries are likely to be substituted for each other in their markets. 
In addition, the results of the TAR and M-TAR model provide sufficient empirical 
evidence in support of asymmetric pricing behavior in beef trade among the TPP countries, 
mostly showing that rate of adjustment to negative shocks to long-run equilibrium tends to 
be more rapid than that for the positive shocks in beef trade among the TPP countries. 
However, in the case of the relationship for USUS-CAN and the CAN-NZ, there is no 
evidence of threshold adjustment, which implies these two pairs of series have symmetric 
price adjustment.  
With the results from the TAR and the M-TAR models, both symmetric and 
asymmetric error correction models are specified to examine the short-run dynamic of beef 
trade among the TPP countries. The results of the asymmetric error correction models 
provide the empirical evidence in support of the presence of asymmetric price adjustment 
in beef trade among the TPP countries. The estimates of the error correction terms in the 
ECM indicate that the response of one price is dependent on either positive shocks or 
negative shocks created by change in another price in each bilateral relationship, as 
showing the different magnitude and speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium in 
each price relationship.  
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The presence of asymmetric price transmission is generally described with the 
factors such as product differentiation, government intervention, and market concentration 
(Ghoshray, 2002). Although contribution of these factors affecting asymmetric price 
adjustment is difficult to hold uniformly in all analyzed cases, there are some reasons that 
could lead to asymmetry price transmission among the TPP countries. First, the existence 
of quality difference might be an important factor causing asymmetric price transmission. 
Due to a premium for high quality beef a response of beef price with high quality will be 
sluggish to a decrease in price of beef with relatively lower quality. Second, policy 
interventions on beef trade and sanitary regulations may hinder the symmetric price 
adjustment. For instance, the United States has beef import quotas, and its volume is 
dependent on the level of domestic production, if TRQ is binding, it may affect 
transmission by international beef price to domestic beef price. Japan has imposed a 38.5% 
tariff on imported beef from all countries and Japan’s sanitary rules (against FMD, BSE, 
and vaccinated against FMD) may have affected beef trade from the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand (Obara et al., 2012). It may lead to weakening the price linkage 
and symmetric price transmission. Finally, local market power originated by concentration 
of the small number of the large-scale meat packers or buyers for imported beef in each 
country may lead to asymmetric price transmission.  
In terms of normative perspective, the relatively slow speed of price adjustment to 
the equilibrium might causes the potential losses to market participants in each market and 
it should need to be corrected in order to improve market efficiency in beef trade among 
the TPP countries. Although investigating the link between empirical identification of 
asymmetric price transmission and factors that have been presented in many previous 
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studies deserves an important field of research, this is outside of the scope in this study at 
this time, but warrants further consideration in follow-up research.   
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CHAPTER 2: EXAMINATION OF ASYMMETRIC SUPPLY 
RESPONSE IN THE U.S. LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Information on agricultural supply response can be regarded as an important 
indicator for policymakers to establish agricultural policies in assessing efficiency in 
agricultural production because the price elasticity of supply can quantify the response of 
producers to changes in economic factors (Albayrak, 1997). In addition, the extent of the 
agricultural supply response is very informative to judge whether there exist efficiencies 
in the current facilities of production in handling the expected quantities, or whether it is 
desirable for the existing policy of products for growth in the agricultural industry.   
In microeconomics, the definition of agricultural supply response is how much 
change in agricultural output occurs with respect to changes in the output price, holding 
other factors fixed. This notion implicitly assumes that the change in output in absolute 
value is the same regardless of whether output prices increase or decrease. In this sense, 
agricultural supply is said to be symmetric or reversible (Mamingi, 1996). The estimates 
of the agricultural supply response in many previous studies are based on this assumption. 
Conversely, asymmetric or irreversible supply response is described as occurring when 
increases or decreases in prices do not lead to the same change in agricultural output. With 
regard to this, Heady et al. (1958) mention that this phenomenon in the agricultural sector, 
in reality the imbalanced changes in output to price increases and price decreases, are 
mainly attributed to sticky assets such as land, buildings or equipment. Although these 
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facilities for agricultural production are introduced in the periods of high output prices, 
producers have few options but to retain the production facilities even in periods of low 
output prices. Consequently, due to practical constraints, decreases in output to falling 
prices do not proportionally match increases in output to rising prices.  
This concern can be found in the context of structural change of the U.S. livestock 
industries. The structures of the livestock industries in the U.S. have changed into efficient 
systems for livestock production by increasing size, specialization of operations and 
technological innovation in production. Specifically, concentration in cattle, hog and 
chicken slaughter has intensified over time. According to the National Farmers Union 
(2014) and USDA (2006), concentration in steer and heifer slaughter has increased since 
1995 with some small firms being acquired by the top four firms and the share of hog 
slaughter by the four largest firms has increased from 46 percent in 1995 to about 63 
percent in 2013. Moreover, the chicken industry has grown to combine production stages 
into large vertically integrated firms that can take advantage of technological advancement 
(National Chicken Council, 2016). In this situation, the ability to attain economies of scale 
might be highly relevant to the success of a large-scale operation. Theoretically, it may be 
feasible when economies of scale are realized so that producers will have a better chance 
to reduce its costs by spreading out per unit fixed costs over an increase in its production 
units. In this sense, concentration of the livestock supply by a small number of the large-
scale livestock producers with the recent structural changes enables them to realize cost 
savings and to allow them to be more competitive than small-scale farm operators (Dyck 
and Nelson, 2003).  
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However, despite the fact that large-scale livestock producers have taken advantage 
of economies of scale for livestock production, many of them might be suffering from 
financial difficulty due to decreases in the real price of livestock for decades (Food & Water 
Watch, 2015). This issue might be highly relevant with the fact that the extent to which 
livestock production has adjusted to a change in output prices under given fixed costs.  
According to USDA_GIPSA (2008), since 2000, the proportion of operating income to 
sales of the larger packers, in spite of having a lower operating expenses ratio, have trended 
downward due to high fixed cost for livestock production and weak output prices. 
Producers may supply livestock for slaughter to the market at the expense of the loss to 
cover the high fixed costs in periods of low prices only if the fixed costs are lower than the 
loss. However, in periods of high prices, if prices are enough to cover the average costs of 
livestock production, the large facilities that have resulted from the economies of scale are 
likely to respond promptly. That is, the move to larger operations that have resulted from 
the economies of scale that exist in many of these sectors today results in an inability to 
adjust to low profitability because of the high capital outlays associated with the large 
facilities yet these same economies of scale allow for quick expansion in periods of high 
profitability. With such issues on the U.S. livestock industry, it can be hypothesized that 
the livestock supply response to changes in the economic factors, especially prices, might 
not be identical as prices increase or decrease.  
The objective of this study is to examine the asymmetric supply response of the 
U.S. livestock industry. In particular, the focus of analysis is on investigating the empirical 
evidence in support of the asymmetric supply behavior of livestock producers as shown in 
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the form of relatively more persistent response to change in a price fall than in response to 
a price increase.  
Most of the empirical studies on asymmetric agricultural supply response are 
applied with an asymmetric generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model to characterize the conditional variances of the time 
series processes (Holt and Aradhyula, 1990; Rezitis and Stavropoulos, 2009). The main 
purpose of these studies is to examine the effect of price uncertainty or volatility in 
agricultural supply response and to more accurately forecast quantity and price associated 
with agricultural commodity. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the residual based 
co-integration analysis examining long-run equilibrium properties, relationships among the 
conditional means of the series of the dynamic process is more informative. In other words, 
residuals, namely discrepancies between the actual values and the fitted values, have more 
useful information because the series process will revert back to long-run equilibrium on 
average (Albayrak 1997). In this sense, the threshold autoregressive (TAR) and the 
momentum threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) model can be considered as an alternative 
method to test for asymmetric supply response. This is because the TAR model can capture 
the magnitude of adjustment to restore the long-run equilibrium and the M-TAR model can 
capture asymmetrically differing amounts of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. 
Therefore, the empirical results will be helpful to gauge the contribution of the recent 
structural changes in livestock production and to judge whether there is the presence of 
potential production efficiencies in the U.S. livestock industries from a normative 
perspective.  
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This study is arranged in the following manner. Section 2 provides a brief review 
of literature associated with agricultural supply response and application of the TAR and 
M-TAR models. Section 3 highlights the econometric methods used while section 4 
introduces data to be analyzed in this study. Section 5 presents the empirical results and 
section 6 provides conclusions.   
2.2. Literature Review 
This study aims to examine asymmetric supply response of livestock with respect 
to economic variables such as output price and feed cost. The fundamental idea of this 
work is based on the long-run relationship between a set of variables. The residuals, 
representing the disequilibrium from the co-integrating equation can be applied in 
assessing both the long-run relationship between variables and patterns of supply response. 
Threshold co-integrating analysis would be an appropriate method for this purpose and can 
assist in discovering empirical evidence on the hypothesis of this study.  
Prior to discussion of the TAR and the M-TAR models, discussion on some 
advantages of application of co-integration analysis in studying agricultural supply 
response should be made. Assuring a co-integrated relationship between variables is a 
prerequisite for proceeding to the estimation of the error correction model (ECM). There 
are many studies that applied the co-integration analysis and ECM to examine agricultural 
supply response (Hallam and Zanoli, 1993; Albayrak, 1997; Mckay et al., 1998: Alemu et 
al., 2003; Tripathi, 2008). The application of both the co-integrating test and the ECM in 
supply response analysis is to ensure that one would obtain a consistent estimate of both 
the short-run and long-run elasticities by using stationary series. Accordingly, the error 
correction model is widely perceived as an alternative method to overcome the spurious 
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regression problem caused by the conventional Nerlovian approach by using non-
stationary series (partial adjustments in actual output and adaptive expectations of output 
price as seen in Nerlove, (1956, 1958), Askari and Cummings (1977), Sunil Kanwar (2004). 
Thus, without considering stationary issues in data series, the value of parameters in the 
conventional model may provide inconsistent estimates.  
Application of the threshold co-integration analysis by using the TAR and the M-
TAR models can be understood in the same context with the importance of conventional 
co-integration analysis. There is no empirical study applied with the TAR and the M-TAR 
model to test for asymmetric agricultural supply response. Since the quantification of a 
price rise and fall is quite difficult in the regression model, the notion of irreversible supply 
response to a change in price has been applied less in empirical study (Mamingi, 1996). 
Most of the studies on asymmetric price transmission in a spatial or vertical context are 
conducted using the TAR and the M-TAR model. Although the scope of analysis and 
policy implications of the results between asymmetric price transmission and asymmetric 
supply response are different, knowledge on statistical techniques and analytic procedures 
of the TAR and M-TAR model applied in price transmission studies is useful in testing for 
the adjustment pattern of supply response in this paper.     
There are several studies that have utilized the threshold co-integration model that 
explain the potential for nonlinear and threshold type adjustment in time series data. The 
study by Goodwin and Holt (1999) examines the vertically asymmetric price transmission 
through the market channel for U.S. beef prices while another study by Goodwin and 
Harper (2000) investigates price transmission among farm, wholesale and retail U.S. pork 
sectors. In order to estimate the threshold between 5% and 95% of the largest negative 
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residuals or positive residuals both studies used a two-dimensional grid search proposed 
by Balke and Fomby (1997). The results of the former study supported the evidence of 
asymmetric price transmission that tends to be transmitted one way from farm to wholesale 
to retail levels but not vice versa. In the latter, they find that threshold effects and 
asymmetric adjustment are significant. In addition, price is unidirectionally transmitted 
from farm gate to wholesale, and to retail levels.     
More recently, other methods for investigating asymmetric price adjustment 
include the TAR model and the M-TAR model introduced by Enders and Granger (1998). 
Abdulai (2002) examines asymmetric price transmission in the Swiss pork market using 
threshold co-integration method. The results suggest that price transmission between the 
producer and retail market showed asymmetric adjustment behavior. Another study by 
Awokuse and Wang (2009) investigate asymmetric price transmission in U.S. dairy 
markets. The findings of this study suggest that there is the presence of asymmetric price 
adjustment from farm gate to retail stages for only butter and fluid milk.   
Further, the study by Ghoshray (2002) examined asymmetric price transmission in 
the global wheat markets by applying the TAR model and the M-TAR model. The 
empirical results in this study show that the international wheat market appears to be 
greatly unitary and that there is lack of evidence for asymmetric price adjustment. However, 
some results of asymmetric adjustment may attribute to the quality difference of wheat 
reflecting different end-uses. Another study by Goychuk and Meyers (2014) was conducted 
to investigate price integration between the Black Sea and international wheat markets. To 
do this, the Johansen ML test and Engle-Granger co-integration test are used. In addition, 
the TAR and the M-TAR model for testing asymmetric price transmission are employed 
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as well. The results of this study indicates that co-integrating relationships between Russian 
wheat prices and EU wheat prices and U.S. wheat prices are valid. In addition, the 
Ukrainian wheat prices are co-integrated with the French wheat price. The study concludes 
that there is the existence of symmetric price transmission in the world wheat market.  
Some findings from previous studies on the application of co-integration analysis 
are important to understand. The first issue is non-stationarity, which will frequently be 
apparent in time series analysis. The spurious regression problem may arise with 
nonstationary time series. As pointed out by Tripathi (2008), this is an important question 
that econometric methods for estimating the supply elasticities should take into account to 
avoid spurious regression problems that can arise when one uses nonstationary series in a 
conventional model approach.  
Second, the specification of the co-integrating equation should be based on the 
static regression framework, which means that variables in the right-hand side of the 
regression model should contain variables that are contemporaneous. Thus, the Engle-
Granger approach and the threshold co-integration test allows us to directly test for the null 
hypothesis that the residuals obtained from the static regression model have a unit root.  
Finally, the Engle-Granger two step procedure is designed to test for pair wise long-
run co-integrating relationships. However, a simple static regression model may lead to 
low power of co-integrating statistics and biased long-run estimates (Albayrak, 1997) 
because, in economic theory, the economic relationship of the agricultural supply generally 
requires more than two variables (Albayrak, 1997). Therefore, specifying a static co-
integrating equation with more than two explanatory variables would be better to avoid the 
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possible drawbacks of a simply specified model in the sense that it is necessary to check 
multiple co-integrating relationships.  
Until recently, no previous study has investigated asymmetric supply response by 
considering the notion of convergence of a long-run relationship between variables. The 
contribution of this study is to take a new attempt by applying the threshold co-integration 
analysis in investigating asymmetric supply response in the U.S. livestock industry. The 
findings from the TAR and the M-TAR model will provide useful information in signaling 
potential inefficiency of livestock production in the context of the recent structural change 
in the U.S. livestock industry. Detailed discussions on the econometric methods are 
included in the next section.    
2.3. Econometric methodology 
Before testing the co-integration relationship between the quantity and the prices, 
test for stationarity of the time series should be required. By doing so, three methods 
including the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), the Phillips-Perron (PP), and the 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) are applied. The appropriate lags can be 
determined in selecting the minimum Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The KPSS 
has some advantages over the ADF and PP tests in that it assumes stationarity of the time 
series, as opposed to the null assumed by the ADF and PP. Since the ADF and PP test 
assume the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of the series, if there is no strong evidence 
for stationarity of time series, the ADF and PP might have a low power to reject the null, 
which might result in a Type II error. Consequently, testing a unit root of the time series 
throughout these three approaches would be a good strategy in terms of a robustness check 
of the characteristic of the time series.  
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In this paper, two approaches are followed to test for co-integration assuming 
symmetric adjustment of the series. To do this, the Engle-Granger and the Johansen co-
integrating test are applied. The Engle and Granger approach is composed of two steps. 
Initially, the co-integrating equation for supply response is estimated by equation 
(2.1)~(2.3) below;  
𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 ∶  𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐻𝑆𝐿𝑇𝑡 = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖
3
𝑖=1
𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑇 + 𝑎5𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐵𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐶𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡     (2.1) 
𝐻𝑜𝑔 ∶  𝑙𝑛𝐵𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑇𝑡 = 𝑏0 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖
3
𝑖=1
𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑇 + 𝑏5𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝐻𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡     (2.2) 
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑛 ∶ 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑄𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑ 𝑐𝑖
3
𝑖=1
𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐4𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑅𝑇 + 𝑐5𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡     (2.3) 
where 𝑆𝐻𝑆𝐿𝑇𝑡 is the cattle (steer and heifer) slaughter at time t,  𝐷𝑖𝑡 is a quarterly dummy 
variable (𝑖 = 1, 2,3), which is used to capture the monthly seasonality effect of cattle 
slaughter, 𝑇𝑅𝑇  is a trend component is used to capture technological change in the 
production process, 𝑃𝐵𝑡  and 𝐹𝐶𝐵𝑡are cattle price and feed cost, respectively, and 𝜀𝑡  is 
error terms. 𝐵𝐺𝑆𝐿𝑇𝑡 and 𝐶𝑄𝑡 stand for hog slaughter and chicken production, respectively, 
𝑃𝑅𝐻𝑡 is the ratio of hog price to feed cost, and 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 represent the ratio of chicken price to 
feed cost. 𝜇𝑡 and 𝜔𝑡 are error terms. Second, the unit root tests (ADF, PP, and KPSS) for 
stationarity of residuals from Equations (2.1)~(2.3) are conducted. If the test result is that 
the residuals are stationary, the variables are said to be co-integrated.  
The Johansen ML procedure is well suited for the co-integration test to multivariate 
series by obtaining more than one co-integration relationship. This paper cites the 
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representation of the Johansen ML method described in the study by Weliwita and 
Govindasamy (1997). Johansen’s approach initially takes its starting point in the general 
VAR(p) model of order of the lower case of p given by 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑍𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑝𝑍𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡      𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇    (2.4) 
where 𝑍𝑡  is an n × 1 vector of variables, and α is the coefficient matrix, 𝜀𝑡 is stochastic 
terms, which are identically and independently normally distributed. This VAR can be re-
written as the following vector ECM;  
∆𝑍𝑡 = 𝛼0 + Π𝑍𝑡−1 + ∑ Γ𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1
∆𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡     (2.5) 
where ∆ denotes first difference, Π indicates the long-run effects, Γ𝑖 stands for the dynamic 
effects. The term of Π𝑍𝑡−1  has information on the co-integrating relationship among 
variables in 𝑍𝑡. Thus,  the Johansen co-integration test mainly aims to estimate the rank (r) 
of Π. If its rank is 0 < r < n, then there exist n × r matrices α and β with rank r such that 
Π = α𝛽′and 𝛽′𝑍𝑡 is stationary, where α represents the adjustment parameter, and β stands 
for a co-integrating vector. The 𝑟 indicates the number of co-integration relationships. 
Enders and Granger (1998), on the other hand, indicate that the inconsistent results 
of co-integration might be derived due to asymmetric adjustment of series. Thus, they 
suggest an alternative specification allowing for asymmetric adjustment, known as the 
threshold autoregressive (TAR) model, and it can be written as: 
∆𝜀?̂? = 𝐼𝑡𝛾1𝜀?̂?−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝑡)𝛾2𝜀?̂?−1 + 𝜔𝑡      (2.6) 
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where ∆𝜀?̂? stands for the first differenced error term from Equations (2.1)~(2.3), 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 
are parameter value of the positive shock and the negative shock, 𝐼𝑡  stands for the 
Heaviside indicator function as shown below:  
𝐼𝑡 = {
1      𝑖𝑓      𝜀?̂?−1 ≥ 𝜏  
0      𝑖𝑓      𝜀?̂?−1 < 𝜏
       (2.7) 
𝐼𝑡 = {
1      𝑖𝑓      Δ𝜀?̂?−1 ≥ 𝜏  
0      𝑖𝑓     Δ 𝜀?̂?−1 < 𝜏
       (2.8) 
𝜏 stands for threshold value proposed by Chan (1993).  
According to Tong (1983), the estimate of the sample mean for the residuals may 
be biased if adjustment of series is asymmetric. For this reason, Chan (1993) suggests that 
it is necessary to find the possible long-run equilibrium values to minimize the sum of 
squared errors from the fitted model as a super-consistent estimate of threshold. The 
estimation procedures of the threshold proposed by Chan (1993) utilize the following steps: 
first, residual series (∆𝜀?̂?) from co-integrating equation are arranged in ascending sort, 
second, 15 percent of the minimum and maximum observations are excluded, and then 70 
percent of the observations are used as a potential threshold. Finally, the equation is 
estimated with Equations (2.7) and (2.8) for each potential threshold value, then the 
equation with the lowest Schwarz criterion (SBC) is chosen. Therefore, it can be considered 
as the best estimate threshold parameter (𝜏).  
The combination of equations (2.6) and (2.7) is referred to as the TAR model and 
the combination of the equations (2.6) and (2.8) is said to be the M-TAR model. According 
to Enders and Granger (1998), the TAR model and the M-TAR model capture “deep” and 
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“sharp” movements of the residual series, respectively7. In the M-TAR model, the potential 
thresholds are based on the change in 𝜀𝑡−1. To interpret the adjustment rate of 𝛾1 and 𝛾2, if 
for example, −1 < 𝛾1 < 𝛾2 < 0, the TAR model represents that the positive discrepancies 
of the 𝜀?̂?  series will tend to return rapidly to the long-run equilibrium relative to the 
negative discrepancies of the residual series. Furthermore, if, for example, |𝛾1| < |𝛾2|, the 
M-TAR model suggests that the negative ∆𝜀?̂?−1 is in substantial decay, while the positive 
∆𝜀?̂?−1  moves relatively slowly back to the attractor. In this paper, given the possible 
economic behavior of producers for supply response as to profitability, two terms are 
defined that the positive shocks (𝛾1) from the long-run equilibrium is made by producers’ 
expectation of higher profitability in the future and the negative shocks (𝛾2) from the long-
run equilibrium is generated by their expectation of lower profitability in the future. 
Two hypotheses are tested by estimating the TAR and the M-TAR model. First, the 
null hypothesis of no co-integration (𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0) is tested. In this test, the Φ-statistic 
is used instead of the F-statistic with a non-standard distribution for the null mentioned 
above. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the co-integration of the series is proven. 
Confirmation of the co-integration of the series allows us to test the null hypothesis that 
there is symmetric adjustment (𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2). In this test, standard F-statistics is recorded 
and used to test the hypothesis that two parameter values are equal. If the null fails to reject, 
it supports the evidence of symmetric supply adjustment. Rejecting the null, on the other 
                                                          
7 The definition of the two terms “deep” and “sharp” as described by Ghoshray (2002, p 301) shows 
“deepness indicates the asymmetry in the magnitude of peaks and troughs and sharpness represents 
the asymmetry in the form of differing speeds at which peaks and troughs are approached”.  
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hand, would indicate that adjustment of supply to the long-run equilibrium is different for 
a positive shock or negative shock. Diagnostic checking for a white noise process for the 
residuals 𝜔𝑡  is performed by using the Ljung-Box test, the Breusch–Godfrey test, and 
Durbin Watson test. If the residuals are serially correlated, the threshold models (the TAR 
and the M-TAR) should be re-specified by adding the additional lags of ∆𝜀?̂? in the form:  
∆𝜀?̂? = 𝐼𝑡𝛾1𝜀?̂?−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝑡)𝛾2𝜀?̂?−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
Δ𝜀?̂?−1 + 𝜔𝑡      (2.9) 
2.4. Data  
The three sectors in this study are the cattle, hog and chicken industries. In this 
empirical investigation, the following quarterly time series data is used: slaughter of cattle 
(SHSLT, thousand head), slaughter of hog (BGSLT, thousand head), production of chicken 
(CQ, million pound), fed steer price (PB, dollar per cwt), price ratio of the hog price to the 
feed cost (PRH, dollars per pound), price ratio of the chicken price to the feed cost (RPC, 
dollars per pound), where the hog price is for barrows and gilts and the chicken price is the 
wholesale price. All price terms in the cattle supply function are deflated by the Producer 
Price Index (PPI) sourced from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Feed cost consists of 
corn price received by producers (dollars per bushel) and 48% soybean meal price (dollars 
per ton). These prices are converted into dollars per cwt, and then a feed cost is calculated 
by applying a weighted average of the corn and soybean meal prices where the weights are 
0.9 and 0.1 for cattle, 0.8 and 0.2 for hog, and 0.7 and 0.3 for chicken, respectively. All 
variables in each supply function are expressed in logarithm. The time periods of the 
analysis is from quarter 1, 1990 to quarter 4, 2015. Descriptive statistics and characteristic 
of each data series are represented in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1. Basic statistical measures of the data series in levels   
Variable Obs Max Min Mean SD Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
SHSLT 104 7,870.31 5,485.36 6,844.99 521.39 271,849.00 -0.09 -0.42 
BGSLT 104 29,587.80 19,102.70 24,590.47 2,512.00 6,308,381.00 0.03 -0.65 
CQ 104 10,372.47 4,494.76 7,780.01 1,585.00 2,512,537.00 -0.51 -0.94 
PB 104 85.07 46.60 57.45 8.24 67.87 1.20 1.36 
FCB 104 254.81 84.15 146.03 37.33 1,394.00 0.85 0.50 
PRH 104 0.68 0.22 0.43 0.12 0.01 0.06 -0.91 
PRC 104 1.64 0.54 1.08 0.24 0.06 0.20 -0.50 
Notes: SHSLT is cattle slaughter (thousand head), BGSLT is hog slaughter (thousand head), CQ is 
chicken production (million pound), PB is fed steer price (dollar per cwt), FCB is cattle feed cost 
(dollar per cwt), PRH is the price ratio of the hog price to feed cost (dollar per pound), and PRC is 
the price ratio of the chicken price to feed cost (dollar per pound).  
 
The visualized plots of data series analyzed in this study are shown in Figures 
2.1~2.4. According to the graphs, the quantity of the cattle slaughter series presents a 
slightly negative trend, while the quantity series of hog slaughter and chicken production 
have positive trends over time. Especially, the chicken production series has an apparently 
stronger upward trend. All price series seem to have an increasing trend over time and 
volatility is intensified at the end of the sample period in the sense that all price series are 
likely to be non-stationary. In particular, the existence of a trend component impacts the 
stationarity results for some quantity series, and the presence of trends will affect the long-
run relationship. Therefore, it is necessary to check which series should be modeled with a 
trend. 
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Figure 2.1.  The plot of cattle slaughter 
 
Source: USDA/ERS.  
 
Figure 2.2. The plot of cattle price and feed cost 
Source: Output price is from USDA/ERS and corn farm price and 48% soybean meal price are 
USDA/NASS Ag Prices Publication and USDA/AMS monthly feedstuff prices, respectively. 
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Figure 2.3. The plot of hog slaughter and price ratio 
 
Source: Hog slaughter and output price are from USDA/ERS, corn farm price and 48% soybean 
meal price are USDA/NASS Ag Prices Publication and USDA/AMS monthly feedstuff prices 
respectively. 
 
Figure 2.4. The plot of chicken production and price ratio 
 
Source: Chicken production is from USDA/ERS, chicken wholesale price is USDA/AMS 
Livestock, Dairy and Poultry Situation and Outlook, and corn farm price and 48% soybean meal 
price are USDA/NASS Ag Prices Publication and USDA/AMS monthly feedstuff prices 
respectively.  
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2.5. Empirical results 
2.5.1. Testing for a unit root  
Before conducting the co-integrating test, the time series to be analyzed in this 
study is required to be examined to determine whether these series have a unit root. For 
this purpose, three testing methods are employed: ADF, PP, and KPSS. Table 2.2 and Table 
2.3 show the results of stationary tests for the logged and the logged first difference series, 
respectively. The null hypothesis of the ADF and the PP test is that the series is non-
stationary. In contrast, the KPSS test is conducted for the null hypothesis for stationarity 
of the series. For each test, the appropriate length of lag for the test of a unit root is 
determined to find the minimum value of the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). 
Concluding whether the series analyzed has a unit root is made by rejecting the null 
hypothesis for the two of the three results (ADF, PP and KPSS).     
The results in Table 2.2 shows that all data series analyzed have the unit root in 
levels based on the results from the three tests. This implies that all series are integrated of 
order one, I(1) because they have a unit root in their log-levels. It implies that taking the 
first difference of all variables is needed to assure stationarity of these series.  
On the basis of the results in Table 2.3, all three tests confirm that all the first 
differenced series do not have the unit root, which means that all series in their first 
difference are stationary. This allows for the conclusion that it is possible that there is the 
presence of a co-integrating relationship among the variables. Therefore, the results allow 
us to proceed with the tests for co-integration on all the series using the Johansen and the 
Engle-Granger co-integration test. 
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Table 2.2. Results of the stationary tests in logged series 
  No. of lags 
ADF PP KPSS 
Drift 
Drift & 
trend 
Drift 
Drift & 
trend 
Drift Trend 
SHSLT 4 -0.10 -1.10 -4.55** -5.34** 0.84** 0.42** 
BGSLT 3 -1.49 -2.41 -2.31 -6.94** 2.45** 0.12* 
CQ 1 -2.22 -2.33 -2.38 -2.57 4.84** 1.17** 
PB 1 -2.04 -2.14 -2.19 -2.27 0.73** 0.70** 
FCB 1 -2.54 -2.72 -2.22 -2.32 0.99** 0.63** 
PRP 3 -2.29 -3.00 -2.47 -3.43* 1.38** 0.15** 
PRC 1 -2.56 -2.78 -2.48 -2.65 1.18** 0.60** 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. The critical value of ADF 
and PP tests at 5% and 10% significance level are obtained from the R. Davidson and J.G. 
Mackinnon (1993), Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. The critical values of test with a 
drift and with a drift and a trend for ADF and PP tests at 5% significant are -2.86 and -3.41, 
respectively and at 10% significant are -2.57 and -3.13, respectively. In the KPSS tests, the critical 
values with a drift and with a trend at 5% significant are 0.463 and 0.146, respectively and at 10% 
significant are 0.347 and 0.119, respectively.  
 
Table 2.3. Results of the stationary tests in the logged first differenced series 
  No. of lags 
ADF PP KPSS 
Drift 
Drift & 
trend 
Drift 
Drift & 
trend 
Drift Trend 
SHSLT 3 -5.58** -6.20** -19.55** -20.09** 0.43* 0.07 
BGSLT 2 -4.74** -4.70** -12.76** -12.69** 0.02 0.02 
CQ 2 -9.87** -11.20** -12.03** -12.52** 0.50** 0.03 
PB 1 -8.98** -9.20** -11.02** -11.14** 0.17 0.03 
FCB 1 -8.04** -8.00** -8.28** -8.24** 0.05 0.05 
PRP 2 -6.62** -6.59** -9.27** -9.22** 0.03 0.03 
PRC 1 -7.83** -7.79** -9.45** -9.4** 0.04 0.04 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. The critical value of ADF 
and PP tests at 5% and 10% significance level are obtained from the R. Davidson and J.G. 
Mackinnon (1993), Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. The critical values of test with a 
drift and with a drift and a trend for ADF and PP tests at 5% significant are -2.86 and -3.41, 
respectively and at 10% significant are -2.57 and -3.13, respectively. For the KPSS tests, the critical 
values with a drift and with a trend at 5% significant are 0.463 and 0.146, respectively and at 10% 
significant are 0.347 and 0.119, respectively.  
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2.5.2. Testing for co-integration under symmetric adjustment of series 
Having established that all data series are confirmed to be integrated of the same 
order of one from the previous section, two approaches are conducted to test for co-
integrating relationships among the variables. In order to do this, first, in the light of the 
key relationship between supply and price terms, a pair-wise co-integrating test for the 
supply response of cattle and hog slaughter and chicken production to  own price and feed 
cost for cattle or the output/feed price ratio for hogs and chicken is conducted with 
Johansen ML approach. Second, the residual-based procedures proposed by Engle-Granger 
is applied by estimating each co-integrating Equation (2.1) ~ (2.3) mentioned above, and 
then residuals obtained from each equation are used for the co-integrating relationship. The 
unit root test of the residuals is conducted with ADF, PP, and KPSS as well.  
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the results of the Johansen co-integrating test. For cattle, 
since the supply function is specified with separate price terms for own price and feed cost 
it is necessary to identify the maximum co-integrating relationships among the variables. 
The results presented in Table 2.4 indicate that the null hypothesis that there is no co-
integrating relationship should be rejected at a significance level of 5%, while one co-
integrating relationship among variables is retained. These results suggest that there is one 
or two long-run relationships among the variables. In addition, according to the results of 
the Johansen pairwise co-integrating test reported in Table 2.5, all bivariate combinations 
of series are co-integrated by rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no long-run co-
integrating relationship between two variables.  
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Table 2.4. Johansen co-integration rank test using the trace for cattle 
𝐻0: 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 = 𝑟 𝐻1: 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 > 𝑟 Trace 
0 0 49.42  (0.00) 
1 1 10.20 (0.27) 
2 2 3.81  (0.05) 
Note: The p-values are presented in parenthesis. The 𝑟  presents the number of co-integrating 
relationship.  
 
 
Table 2.5. Johansen co-integration rank test for each pairs of series  
  No. of lags 𝐻0: 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 = 𝑟 𝐻1: 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 > 𝑟 Trace 
SHSLT – PB 2 
0 0 45.40 (0.00) 
1 1 4.41 (0.04) 
SHSLT – FCB 1 
0 0 28.31 (0.00) 
1 1 3.65 (0.06) 
BGSLT – PRP  4 
0 0 18.55 (0.08) 
1 1 7.26 (0.11) 
CQ – PRC 3 
0 0 20.20 (0.01) 
1 1 5.14 (0.02) 
Note: The p-values are presented in parenthesis. The 𝑟 represents the number of co-integrating 
relationship.  
 
 
Table 2.6. Engle-Granger co-integration tests 
Dependent 
variable 
No. of lags 
ADF PP KPSS 
Drift 
Drift 
 & trend 
Drift 
Drift  
& trend 
Drift Trend 
SHSLT 1 -3.67** -3.64** -4.24** -4.22** 0.29 0.29** 
BGSLT 3 -3.62** -3.65** -3.52** -3.50** 0.20 0.20** 
CQ 1 -3.01** -3.02 -3.16** -3.12* 0.82** 0.81** 
Note: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. The t-statistic is stated in 
parenthesis. The critical value of ADF and PP tests at 5% and 10% significance level are obtained 
from the R. Davidson and J.G. Mackinnon (1993), Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. The 
critical values of test with a drift and with a drift and a trend for ADF and PP tests at 5% significant 
are -2.86 and -3.41, respectively and at 10% significant are -2.57 and -3.13, respectively. For the 
KPSS tests, the critical values with a drift and with a trend at 5% significant are 0.463 and 0.146, 
respectively and at 10% significant are 0.347 and 0.119, respectively. 
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According to the results of the Engle-Granger co-integration test, the ADF and the 
PP test support the validity of rejecting the null hypothesis that residuals in the static 
regression on the supply models are non-stationary. Despite the results of the KPSS 
representing insufficient evidence of stationarity of series, since the presence of a co-
integrating relationship is confirmed by two of the three test results it can be accepted that 
there is the existence of the long-run equilibrium relationship with co-integration 
established in all tests. Concluding the existence of long-run equilibrium relationships 
allows us to use the residuals in specifying the TAR and the M-TAR model to test for 
asymmetric supply response.  
2.5.3. Testing for co-integration under asymmetric adjustment of series  
As mentioned above, both the TAR and the M-TAR models are designed to 
examine whether variables in the supply models presented in the previous section have a 
co-integrating relationship with the threshold adjustment and to check the asymmetric 
pattern of adjustment. For this purpose, the discrepancies obtained from each co-integrating 
equation estimated by the static regression are employed to test for both stationarity of 
residuals and asymmetric supply. By applying the statement on the TAR and the M-TAR 
models described in Ghoshray (2002), in this study the TAR model allows the extent of 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium to depend on the quantity discrepancies. The M-
TAR model allows the quantity deviations to show differing levels of adjustment.   
Table 2.7 represents the estimated results of the TAR model. The coefficients of 𝛾1 
and  𝛾2 should be negative, implying the convergence of the TAR model (Ghoshray, 2002). 
The estimate of 𝛾1 represents the adjustment rate of the positive deviation from the long-
run equilibrium and the estimate of 𝛾2  stands for the adjustment rate of the negative 
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discrepancy from the long-run equilibrium. The estimate of 𝛾1 for both SHSLT and CQ are 
significant at a significance level of 5%, and the estimate of 𝛾2 for SHSLT and CQ is 
significant at the 10% significance level. Both estimates of 𝛾1  and 𝛾2  for BGSLT are 
significant at the 5% significance level, respectively. To interpret the estimates of 𝛾1 and 
𝛾2 , the example of SHSLT, -0.43 of 𝛾1  shows that about 43 percent of the positive 
discrepancy from the long-run equilibrium is corrected in a quarter, and the estimate of 𝛾2 
(-0.19) represents that about 19 percent of the negative discrepancy from the long-run 
equilibrium is corrected within a quarter. Additionally, for both BGSLT and CQ, the 
positive adjustment rate to the long-run equilibrium within a quarter is 27 percent and 23 
percent, respectively. Additionally, approximately 17 percent of the negative deviation for 
BGSLT and 12 percent of the negative deviation of CQ revert back to the long-run 
equilibrium within a quarter, respectively.  
Table 2.7. The results of TAR model for cattle, hog, and chicken 
 Variable SHSLT BGSLT CQ 
𝛾1 -0.43 [-4.26]** -0.27 [-2.82]** -0.23 [-2.94]** 
𝛾2 -0.19 [-1.91]* -0.17 [2.13]** -0.12 [-1.70]* 
 𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 (Φ) 10.89** 6.24** 5.77** 
𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 (𝐹)  2.71 (0.10) 0.59 (0.44) 1.11 (0.29) 
 τ 0.0243 0.0174 -0.0328 
 𝐿𝑀𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡  0.32 (0.57) 0.09 (0.76) 0.21 (0.65) 
 𝐷𝑊 2.07 1.99 2.06 
  𝑄(6) 17.40 (0.01) 2.35 (0.88) 6.50 (0.37) 
 𝐹𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 10.89 (0.00) 6.24 (0.00) 5.77 (0.00) 
SBC -470.22 -517.56 -425.90 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 stand for the 
coefficients of adjustment and 𝑡-statistics is in bracket for the null hypothesis 𝛾1 = 0 and 𝛾2 = 0, 
respectively. Values of 𝛷-statistic for the TAR model with n = 100 for the null hypothesis 𝛾1 =
𝛾2 = 0 at 5% and 10% significance level are 4.64 and 3.79, respectively. Critical values for 𝛷-
statistic are calculated by Enders and Granger (1998). P-values are stated in the parenthesis.   
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In comparison of each sector, both the positive shock and the negative shock for 
SHSLT is likely to return more quickly to equilibrium than the case of BGSLT and CQ. 
However, in the case of CQ, both the positive and negative shocks tend to be relatively 
more persistent than the other sectors. This implies that producers in the cattle industry 
may be able to respond more efficiently to increases or decreases in their expectation of 
profitability than those in other sectors.  
In order to test for the null hypothesis that there is no co-integration (𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 =
𝛾2 = 0), it is necessary to compare the Φ-statistic recorded to the critical value computed 
by Enders and Granger (1998) instead of the 𝐹-statistic. The critical values at the 5% and 10% 
significance level for 100 observations are 5.02 and 4.11, respectively. The results indicate 
that the null hypothesis of no co-integration is rejected in all cases at the 5% significance 
level. These results are consistent with the results of co-integration test under symmetric 
adjustment presented in the previous section. The null hypothesis that there is symmetric 
adjustment (𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 = 𝛾2) is tested by using the 𝐹-statistic. P-values corresponding to the 
𝐹-statistic are stated in the parenthesis. The results present that the null hypothesis is 
rejected in all cases. This implies that there is no empirical evidence in support of 
asymmetric supply adjustment in estimated results of the TAR model.  
Diagnostic checking of serial correlation of the residuals of the TAR model is 
performed by using the Breusch–Godfrey test, the Ljung-Box test, and Durbin Watson test. 
The results indicate that there is no serial correlation of residuals, which implies that the 
residuals follow a white noise process. This implies that there is no need to take the 
additional lagged terms of ∆𝜀?̂? in the TAR model to correct the autocorrelation of residuals. 
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The consistent estimate of threshold proposed by Chan (1993) for SHSLT, BGSLT, and 
CQ is 0.0243, 0.0174, and -0.0328, respectively. 
Second, from Table 2.8, the estimated adjustment rate of 𝛾1  and  𝛾2  should be 
negative representing convergence for the M-TAR model. The value of both 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 for 
SHSLT are -0.45 and -0.21, respectively, and they are significant at the 5% significance 
level. For BGSLT, the estimate of 𝛾1  (-0.43) and  𝛾2  (-0.12) are significant at the 
significance level of 5% and 10%, respectively. However, for CQ, only the estimate of 𝛾2 
is significant at the significance level of 5%. The rate of adjustment estimated from the M-
TAR model is quite different from that of the TAR model. For the sharp movement in the 
quantity discrepancy, in the case of SHSLT and BGSLT, the adjustment rate of the positive 
deviation to the long-run equilibrium shows a similar fashion corresponding to -0.45 of 
SHSLT and -0.43 of BGSLT, respectively. In the case of CQ, on the other hand, the 
negative shock tends to quickly revert to the attractor as compared to other sectors.  
To test for the null hypothesis of no co-integration (𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0), comparing 
Φ-statistic with the critical values in the case of the M-TAR is required. The results indicate 
that the null hypothesis is rejected at the significance level of 5% in all cases. This implies 
that there is empirical evidence of a co-integration relationship among the series. The co-
integrating test by the M-TAR model also comes to the same results with the case of 
symmetric adjustment. Next, the 𝐹-statistic for testing the null hypothesis that adjustment 
is symmetric (𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 = 𝛾2) indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected for SHSLT, 
which indicates that the supply response of SHSLT may be adjusted symmetrically. 
However, the null hypothesis of symmetric supply adjustment is rejected at the significance 
levels of 5% and 10%, respectively, in the case of both BGSLT and CQ, as opposed to the 
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results of the TAR model. These findings suggest that there is empirical evidence in support 
of the presence of asymmetric supply response in the hog and chicken sectors.  
The Breusch–Godfrey test, the Ljung-Box test, and the Durbin Watson test are 
conducted to check a serial correlation of the residuals of the M-TAR model. The results 
show that residuals are not serially correlated with each other, which means that the 
residuals are a white noise process. With this result, the M-TAR model can be specified 
without the additional lagged terms of ∆𝜀?̂?. The consistent estimate of threshold proposed 
by Chan (1993) for SHSLT, BGSLT, and CQ is 0.0179, 0.0098, and 0.006, respectively.   
Table 2.8. The results of M-TAR model for cattle, hog, and chicken 
 Variable SHSLT BGSLT CQ 
𝛾1 -0.45 [-4.07]** -0.43 [-4.09]** -0.05 [0.66] 
𝛾2 -0.21 [-2.23]** -0.12 [-1.69]* -0.26 [-3.76]** 
 𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 (Φ) 10.75** 9.81** 7.27** 
𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 (𝐹)  2.59 (0.11) 6.04 (0.02) 3.76 (0.06) 
 τ 0.0179 0.0098 0.006 
 𝐿𝑀𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡  0.44 (0.51) 0.61 (0.44) 0.27 (0.61) 
 𝐷𝑊 2.09 2.07 2.07 
  𝑄(6) 18.72 (0.00) 4.09 (0.66) 7.06 (0.32) 
 𝐹𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 10.75 (0.00) 9.81 (0.00) 7.27 (0.00) 
SBC -464.57 -521.65 -423.59 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 stand for the 
coefficients of adjustment and 𝑡-statistics is in bracket for the null hypothesis 𝛾1 = 0 and 𝛾2 = 0, 
respectively. Values of 𝛷-statistic for the M-TAR model with n = 100 for the null hypothesis 
𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 at 5% and 10% significance level are 5.02 and 4.11, respectively. Critical values for 
𝛷-statistic are calculated by Enders and Granger (1998). P-values are stated in the parenthesis. 
 
Finally, there are some suggestions on selecting a model between the TAR and the 
M-TAR model proposed by the previous studies. First, Goychuk and Meyers (2014) 
demonstrate that asymmetric adjustment can be considered in the series analyzed if one of 
two models fails to confirm the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment. Second, Enders 
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and Granger (1998) mention that the model with the best overall fit can be selected by 
using the SBC or the Akaike information criterion (AIC) test if both the TAR and M-TAR 
models show asymmetric or symmetric adjustment.  In this sense, in the case of SHSLT, 
the TAR model with the lower value of the SBC is preferable to the M-TAR model to 
represent the symmetric pattern of adjustment. In addition, the results of the M-TAR 
models exhibiting the asymmetric type of adjustment in the cases of both BGSLT and CQ 
support the presence of asymmetric supply adjustment in the hog and chicken sectors.  
2.5.4. Interpretation of the long-run adjustment  
Focusing on the point estimates of 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 estimated by the M-TAR model, this 
section discusses the long-run adjustment of supply in each livestock sector. The 
calculation of how many quarters are required to adjust under a proportion of probability 
(𝑝) of the disequilibrium is made by the following formula presented in the study by 
Ghoshray (2002).   
𝑛 =
log (1 − 𝑝)
log (1 − 𝛾)
     (2.10) 
where n stands for the number of quarters, 𝑝  is a proportional probability of the 
disequilibrium to be restored, and 𝛾 is the adjustment rate to the long-run equilibrium.  
 In the case of SHSLT, the M-TAR model confirms the mechanism of symmetric 
adjustment with 𝛾1  of 0.45 and 𝛾2  of 0.21. By using the formula above, it will take 
approximately 4~10 quarters (equivalent to about 1 ~ 2 years and 5 months) to adjust the 
cattle supply to correct 90 percent of the disequilibrium to positive or negative shock. In 
both cases of BGSLT and CQ, there might be mechanism of asymmetric supply adjustment. 
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In the hog case, the absolute value of 𝛾1 is larger than that of 𝛾2. This implies the positive 
discrepancy from the long-run equilibrium generated by the producers’ expectation of high 
profitability may more quickly adjust to equilibrium while the negative discrepancy created 
by the producers’ expectation of low profitability tends to persist. By using the same 
formula, adjustment of hog supply to correct 90 percent of the disequilibrium to a positive 
shock may be required to take approximately 4 quarters (equivalent to about 1 year), while 
a negative shock will be corrected in 18 quarters (equivalent to about 4 years and 5 months). 
In contrast, for chicken, the point estimate of 𝛾2 is larger than that of 𝛾1. This indicates that 
the M-TAR model shows fast speed of adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium to a 
negative shock (about 10 months), but slow decay toward equilibrium to a positive shock 
(about 1 year and 8 months). Taken together, the conclusion can be reached that the recent 
structural changes of cattle industry might improve the cattle production system, while 
there might exist potential production inefficiencies that should be corrected in both the 
hog and chicken industries.  
2.6. Conclusion  
 This study aims to examine asymmetric supply response of the U.S. cattle, hog and 
chicken sectors. This concern can be found in the context of structural change of the U.S. 
livestock industries. That is, the move to larger operations that have resulted from the 
economies of scale that exist in many of these sectors today results in an inability to adjust 
to low profitability because of the high capital outlays associated with the large facilities, 
yet these same economies of scale allow for quick expansion in periods of high profitability. 
In this sense, the empirical evidence in support of asymmetric supply adjustment would be 
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important information for both researchers and policymakers who might need to have 
insights into the potential inefficiencies of the livestock industry that must be understood.  
For this purpose, as a part of the preliminary analysis, the stationary test (ADF, PP, 
and KPSS) for the data series and Johansen and Engle-Granger co-integration test are 
conducted and to test for the presence of asymmetric adjustment, the threshold 
autoregressive (TAR) and the momentum threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) models are 
applied to quarterly time series data for the quantity of slaughter (cattle and hog) and 
production (chicken), and price over the 1990-2015 sample period. The results of co-
integrating test indicates that there is the existence of the long-run equilibrium relationship 
with co-integration established in all sectors.  
Concluding the existence of long-run equilibrium relationships allows us to use the 
residuals in specifying the TAR and the M-TAR models to test for asymmetric supply 
response. The findings provided from the TAR model suggests that there is a co-integrating 
relationship among variables in all cases and the supply response in all cases is 
symmetrically adjusted. Additionally, both the positive and the negative discrepancies for 
cattle slaughter appear to more rapidly revert to the equilibrium than hog slaughter or 
chicken production. This implies that producers in the cattle industry may more efficiently 
respond to an increase or a decrease in their expectation of profitability than those who are 
engaged in the other sectors.  
In contrast, the results of the M-TAR models exhibiting the asymmetric type of 
adjustment in the cases of both hog slaughter and chicken production support the presence 
of asymmetric supply adjustment in both the hog and chicken sectors.  The empirical results 
for the hog industry would be meaningful in the sense that the positive deviation from the 
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long-run equilibrium created by the producers’ expectation of high profitability may 
quickly adjust to equilibrium while the negative discrepancy created by the producers’ 
expectation of low profitability tend to persist. Overall, the empirical results suggest that 
there is evidence in support of symmetric supply response for the cattle industry, while 
there is the presence of asymmetric supply response for the hog and chicken industries. 
These findings imply that the recent structural change in the cattle industry contributes to 
improving the production efficiency for cattle, but in the hog and chicken industries, there 
might exist potential production inefficiencies.   
Finally, the results of this study could be a useful reference material for future 
studies on estimating supply response using time series data, the structure of the livestock 
industry, and policy programs associated with price and cost of production. Notably, 
information on asymmetric supply adjustment obtained from this study would be a useful 
source in estimating supply function by using time series data. In addition, further studies 
in this field are needed to investigate the exact causes resulting in an asymmetric pattern 
of supply adjustment in the U.S. livestock industry.   
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CHAPTER 3: INVESTIGATION OF ASYMMETRIC PRICE 
TRANSMISSION IN THE U.S. PORK MARKET BY USING 
THRESHOLD CO-INTEGRATION ANALYSIS  
 
3.1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, the U.S. pork industry has been marked by numerous 
structural changes which have significantly improved efficiency for pork production 
(USDA, 2006). The structure of the pork industry has become more concentrated with more 
intensive operations for meat production using low priced inputs (e.g., feed, labor and 
equipment etc.) to provide low-priced products to consumers. Consolidation of small and 
medium scale farms has led to a small number of large scale farms in producing hogs. In 
2012, only 12 percent of large operations with more than 2,000 hogs and pigs bred 90 
percent of hogs and pigs (USDA/NASS, 2014). Furthermore, the meat packing industry 
also has been dominated by a few major firms through many mergers and acquisitions, 
resulting in industry concentration. Specifically, the degree of concentration in the food 
market is measured by the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4)8. According to USDA (2006) 
and the National Farmers Union (2014), the recent CR4 for pork packers was about 63 
percent in 2013, compared to 46 percent in 1995. By definition of the CR4, the U.S. pork 
market could be considered as a market exhibiting characteristics of an imperfectly 
                                                          
8 The concentration ratio (CR4, relative to 100%) of the top four firms in a certain food industry 
implies that if the value is lower, the market might be close to be perfect competition. The top four 
firms of meat packers include Smithfield, Tyson, Swift, and Cargill. 
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competitive market. This assumption implies that a small number of large-scale pork meat 
packers may have significant market share and exercise market power. The presence of 
market power in the processing or retail sectors is most commonly cited as a factor leading 
to asymmetric price transmission (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Under 
imperfect competition in processing and retail levels, sticky or slow response of price in 
one stage of the market channel to changes in price in another stage of the market channel 
might be a common concern. Especially in the agricultural sector, many authors suggest 
that an increase in input prices leading to margin squeezing is likely to be more quickly 
transferred to the output prices than the case of margin stretching created by a decrease in 
input prices (von Cramon-Taubadel, 1998; Boyd and Brorsen. 1988; Miller and Hayenga, 
2001; Abdulai, 2002). Given the facts described about the U.S. pork industry, it can be 
hypothesized that price adjustment in the U.S. pork market is likely to be asymmetric.  
This study aims to examine asymmetric price transmission in the U.S. pork 
marketing channels. By doing so, Enders and Granger (1998)’ threshold co-integration 
analysis is applied in the context of consistency of analyzed results allowing for 
asymmetric adjustment for co-integration analysis.  
Knowledge of the vertical price transmission among the various marketing levels 
is important to understand the overall operation of the market. In consideration of the 
various stages of the market linked primarily by price mechanisms, the degree and the 
speed of adjustment to which prices are transmitted in the marketing chain might be a 
crucial indicator in presenting the behaviors of market participants at alternative levels and 
may have important implications for welfare distribution associated with spreading 
marketing margins and mark-up pricing practices in a normative fashion (Goodwin and 
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Holt, 1999). Asymmetric price adjustment in a vertical context is widely accepted as 
evidence of the potential inefficiencies across the marketing channels (Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Thus, empirical findings in this study will have important 
implications in assessing the contribution of the recent structural change in the U.S. pork 
market in terms of market efficiency for policy purposes.  
This study is constructed as follows. Section 3.2 discusses previous studies on 
vertical price transmission of livestock market. Section 3.3 highlights the econometric 
methods. Section 3.4 introduces description of analyzed data.  Section 3.5 represents the 
empirical results. Section 3.6 summarizes results and policy implications.   
3.2. Literature review 
3.2.1. Factors affecting asymmetric pattern of price adjustment in a vertical context 
 The major factors affecting asymmetric patterns of price adjustment introduced in 
the literature includes imperfect competition, adjustment costs, inventory management, and 
asymmetric information. One potential source of asymmetric price adjustment is a 
noncompetitive market structure. In economic theory, under the competitive market, the 
response of output prices is expected to be the same with respect to either increasing or 
decreasing input prices. In agricultural commodity marketing channels, on the other hand, 
the farm level is usually less concentrated than the wholesale level or the retail level. This 
suggests that the wholesale and retail levels are more likely to show substantial market 
power by only a few participants. Bailey and Brorsen (1989) point out that market power 
would be on the buyer’s side from the fact that the U.S. fed cattle market has been 
characterized by a high concentration in the meat packing industry. Given that the U.S. 
pork industry has experienced a similar structural change as the U.S. fed cattle industry, it 
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is reasonable to conjecture that market power may exist in marketing levels beyond the 
farm gate. Under this condition, oligopolistic processors might respond more quickly to 
squeezing margins created by the positive price shock than to stretching margins resulting 
from a negative price shock, leading to asymmetric price transmission (von Cramon-
Taubadel, 1998; Balke et al., 1998; Abdulai, 2002; Awokuse and Wang, 2009). In 
particular, more details discussed in the study by Balke et al. (1998) explain that due to 
tacit collusion among oligopolistic firms, adjustment of rising output price to rising input 
prices is faster in order to keep their unspoken agreement while with a decrease in input 
prices, all firms may slowly adjust to low output prices to signal reluctance of breaking 
their unspoken collusion.  
 Second, adjustment cost (or menu cost) is regarded as another major source of 
asymmetric price adjustment. The adjustment costs occur when either quantity or price is 
adjusted with respect to changes in market conditions. Participants in the market adjust the 
costs differently according to their economic conditions (Bailey and Brorson, 1989; von 
Cramon-Taubadel, 1998). In general, a wait-and-see attitude by retailers who might want 
to reap more benefits from adjusting prices rather than costs of adjustment could result in 
less frequent repricing or rigidity (Abdulai, 2002; Awokuse and Wang, 2009). Asymmetric 
behavior by adjustment costs is found in the study on the U.S. beef market by Bailey and 
Brorson (1989). They show that meat packers who have large amounts of fixed costs by 
investing high outlays in their facilities may be willing to reduce margins in the short run 
in order to continue to operate their plants by competitively bidding up farm prices quickly 
to compete with other packers, but lowering bids more slowly in order to maintain volume. 
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In other words, packers facing high adjustment costs are likely to avoid rising prices swiftly 
despite of squeezing margins.   
 Next, asymmetric information between competing firms is commonly viewed as 
one of the causes for asymmetric price adjustment. Firms can obtain various public hog 
market information provided by the government as well as gathering other private 
information associated with market situations. According to the study by Bailey and 
Brorsen (1989), large firms pursuing economies of size are more likely to invest in 
collecting both the public and private market information and to more efficiently use the 
information to maximize their profits compared to relatively smaller scale operators. This 
asymmetric information in competing between firms could lead to asymmetric patterns of 
price adjustment.    
 A final factor resulting in asymmetric price adjustment is inventory management. 
Blinder (1982) points out that firms’ decisions on the levels of inventories is usually made 
in the short-run when prices are temporarily changed, and the inventory behavior could 
lead to the positive asymmetric price transmission. Specifically, firms that face low 
demand tend to adjust relative to the large quantity produced and build up inventory instead 
of reducing output prices. In contrast, if firms are experiencing high demand, they are 
forced to increase output prices (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 1998).   
3.2.2. The main findings of the previous studies on livestock industries  
There are a lot past studies on investigating vertical price transmission in livestock 
markets. Of these studies, literature on asymmetric price transmission of the pork market 
in a vertical context include Boyd and Brorsen (1988), Hahn (1990), Griffith and Piggott 
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(1994), von Cramon-Taubadel (1998), Goodwin and Harper (2000), Miller and Hayenga 
(2001), and Abdulai (2002). Different authors have applied different econometric 
techniques to test for asymmetric price transmission. In a broad sense, empirical 
applications of econometric methods to examine asymmetric price transmission can be 
classified into two parts: 1) pre-co-integration analysis and 2) application of co-integration 
approach.  
The literature on application of the pre-co-integration approach includes Boyd and 
Brorsen (1988), Hahn (1990), Griffith and Piggott (1994). Boyd and Brorsen (1988) apply 
Ward’s (1982) approach to overcome the shortcoming of the static model proposed by 
Wolffram (1971) and Houck (1977). They use a dynamic framework to capture changes in 
price for the long time period by differentiating type of transmission shaped by either the 
magnitude or the speed by using weekly pork data from January 1974 to August 1981. Two 
hypotheses of asymmetric price transmission were tested: the first is the total impact of a 
decrease in price is equal to the total impact of an increase in price and the second is that 
the speed of adjustment to an increase in price is equal to that of a price fall. The results 
suggest that there is little support of vertically asymmetric price response for the U.S. pork 
market.  
Hahn (1990) introduces the Generalized Switching Model (GSM) to capture the 
asymmetric price transmission across the U.S. beef and pork markets by using monthly 
price series with time periods from January 1980 to March 1987. The results indicate that 
both prices of beef and pork show a higher response to increasing price shocks than to 
decreasing price shocks. Particularly, the beef farm price responds quicker to an increase 
in the wholesale price than to a decrease in the wholesale price.  
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The study by Griffith and Piggott (1994) examines asymmetric price transmission 
in the Australian meat market by using monthly price series for beef, lamb and pork at the 
farm, wholesale, and retail levels over the period from January 1971 to December 1988. 
The model applied in this study is based on the model proposed by Kinnucan and Forker 
(1987) which is a modified version of Houck’s (1977) model by considering the lagged 
structures of both the price rising and the price falling terms as an explanatory variable. 
The results indicate that both retailers and wholesalers for pork asymmetrically adjust to a 
change in input prices, while retailers and wholesalers for beef and lamb react 
asymmetrically to changes in input prices.  
Meanwhile, the study by Miller and Hayenga (2001) examine the symmetry in price 
cycle between high frequency and low frequency by using Engle’s band spectrum 
regression in the U.S. pork market. The weekly price series are used with the time period 
over 1981-1995. The analysis is based on the concept of response of firms with respect to 
high- and low frequency price levels. The results point out that the asymmetrical price 
transmission is observed from wholesale prices to retail prices at relatively low-frequency 
price levels, while change in farm prices asymmetrically transmitted to wholesale prices at 
all frequency cycles.   
Next, the main studies of empirical application of co-integration analysis in the 
pork market include Cramon-Taubadel (1998), Goodwin and Harper (2000), and Abdulai 
(2002). The study by von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) examines the asymmetric price 
transmission between producer and wholesale pork prices in northern Germany based on 
200 weekly observations during from January 1990 to October 1993. For this purpose, he 
applies both the ECM suggested by Engle and Granger (1987) and its model extended by 
83 
 
incorporating asymmetric adjustment terms introduced by Granger and Lee (1989). The 
results indicate that there is asymmetric price transmission in northern Germany by 
showing quicker response of wholesale price to increase in producer price than that to 
decrease in producer price.  
Goodwin and Harper (2000) investigate price linkages across the U.S. pork market 
based on weekly price series from January 1987 to January 1999. The analysis of this study 
is conducted by using the threshold ECM proposed by Balke and Fomby (1997) allowing 
for asymmetric patterns of adjustment with respect to positive and negative price shocks. 
A two-dimensional grid search is applied to find two thresholds based on minimizing a 
sum of squared error. The ECM is estimated by using these threshold values. The central 
idea of this method is that the deviation from the long-run equilibrium between a co-
integrated pair in the series will only respond if they exceed a specific threshold level. That 
is, the threshold effect is generally driven by adjustment costs (Balke and Fomby, 1997; 
Azzam, 1999; Goodwin and Harper, 2000). It means that a price adjustment to revert back 
toward long-run equilibrium only occurs when the deviations from long-run equilibrium is 
greater than costs. The results show that asymmetries exist, but observed asymmetries are 
minor. Furthermore, its pattern is unidirectional from farm to wholesale, and from 
wholesale to retail levels. They conclude that the structural change in the U.S. pork market 
may lead to the improved efficiency of the price transmission mechanism.  
Another study by Abdulai (2002) investigates asymmetric adjustment to long-run 
equilibrium in Switzerland pork market with monthly series over the period from January 
1988 to September 1997. The threshold co-integration test suggested by Enders and 
Granger (1998) considering asymmetric patterns of adjustment toward the long-run 
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equilibrium was applied. This can be regarded as the major distinction compared to the 
Engle and Granger’s (1987) co-integration test under the assumption that adjustment is 
asymmetric applied in the other studies cited above. The analysis comes to the conclusion 
that there is asymmetric pattern of price adjustment from producer and retail chain in the 
Swiss pork market, in the sense that a decrease in the marketing margin more quickly 
passes through to retail prices than an increase in the marketing margin.  
3.2.3. Summary  
In light of methodological context, on the other hand, pre-co-integration approaches 
mentioned above have some shortcomings (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004; 
Abdulai, 2002). First, Houck (1997)’ model and its extended or modified version might 
result in the problem of multicollinearity. That is, the increasing and decreasing terms in 
the right-hand side of a regression equation are likely to be correlated with each other. The 
estimates of parameters may be biased due to multicollinearity, consequently this could 
lead to a lack of power in testing for the null hypothesis of symmetry (Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel, 2004).  
Second, given that most price series appear to have a non-stationary spurious 
regression problem, this would be a major concern in a price transmission study using price 
series. In this sense, von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) and (Abdulai, 2002) indicate that there 
might be room for doubt about a spurious regression that originates from the use of non-
stationary series in the empirical application of pre-co-integration methods cited above. 
Furthermore, Abdulai (2002) mentions that although policy changes or seasonal factors 
may let them temporarily drift apart in the short-run, the market mechanism may cause 
them to move back together in the long-run. In co-integration analysis, if a test proves that 
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two non-stationary series are co-integrated with each other, i.e., spurious regression is 
avoided, then the long-run equilibrium relationship between series is valid. Co-integration 
analysis is germane to the application of the error correction model. Since co-integrating 
analysis is designed to overcome the spurious regression problem, its process is required 
prior to estimating the ECM in order to obtain and use the residuals of estimation, which 
measure discrepancies from the long-run between a pair of series. Application of the ECM  
incorporating asymmetric components would be better to identify asymmetric patterns of 
price transmission than the conventional models that have been employed (Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel, 2004).  
Finally, according to Enders and Granger (1998), the co-integration test could lead 
to a potential inconsistency if there is asymmetric price adjustment. This is because the 
standard Dickey-Fuller test assumes symmetric adjustment it is possible to fail to find a 
long equilibrium between series (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). The potential 
problem of the co-integration test used in the previous studies might be solved through an 
application of the threshold co-integration test allowing for asymmetric price adjustment 
introduced by Enders and Granger (1998). This approach makes it possible to detect how 
a downstream price adjustment occurs given a shock from upstream prices depending on 
whether the shock is sourced from an increase in price or a decrease in price.   
In short, regarding the research on price transmission in a vertical context of the 
U.S. pork market, there is no study of the application of the threshold co-integration test 
introduced by the Enders and Granger (1998) regardless of whether the null of symmetric 
price adjustment holds. With consideration of the shortcomings presented in the previous 
studies, a clear distinction of this study can be found that the application of the Ender and 
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Granger’s (1998) co-integration method in this study can not only overcome the spurious 
regression problem but also make up for the limitation of the Engle-Granger co-integration 
test by obtaining the consistent estimate in the regression.  
3.3. Econometric methodology 
Previous studies on vertical asymmetry price transmission are conducted by using 
the time series model to link between upstream price and downstream price in the market. 
Generally, in these studies, upstream prices are thought of as input prices for raw materials 
in farm gate or manufacturing levels and downstream prices are considered as prices of 
output produced by using raw materials in a certain market level beyond farm gate. Based 
on this concept, in the price relationship between producer and wholesaler, prices of 
producer are viewed as the input price to wholesalers, and wholesale prices represent the 
output prices. Similarly, in the price relationship between wholesaler and retailer, prices of 
wholesale stand for the input prices to retailers and retail prices are considered as the output 
prices. In this sense, this study follows the definition presented in the study by Meyer and 
von Cramon-Taubadel (2004): 1) positive asymmetry implies that the price adjustment that 
increases in input price or decreases in output price (i.e., margin squeezing) is transmitted 
more quickly to output price or input price, respectively than the price adjustment as input 
price falls or output price rises (i.e., margin stretching); and 2) negative asymmetry means 
that price adjustment is transmitted more quickly to margin stretching than margin 
squeezing.  
As mentioned above concerning the issues of non-stationarity of price series, prior 
to conducting tests for the co-integration relationship between a pair of price series in pork 
marketing channels, it is necessary to confirm that the series have a unit root. By doing so, 
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three methods such as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP), and 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) are applied. The length of lag can be 
determined in choosing the minimum Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The KPSS 
has certain advantages over the ADF and PP tests in that it assumes stationarity of the time 
series, as opposed to the null assumed by the ADF and PP. Due to the assumption of the 
null of the ADF and PP, if there is no strong evidence for stationarity of time series, the 
ADF and PP might have a low power to reject the null, which might result in a Type II 
error. Consequently, testing a unit root of the time series throughout these three approaches 
would be a good strategy in terms of a robustness check of the characteristic of the time 
series.  
In this paper, co-integration tests allowing for the assumption of the null hypothesis 
of symmetric price transmission is conducted. For this purpose, the Engle-Granger two 
step procedure is applied. Alternatively, the threshold co-integration test introduced by 
Enders and Granger (1998) allowing for asymmetric price adjustment is also used to correct 
the potential inconsistency which might result from the misspecification if price 
transmission is asymmetric.  
The Engle and Granger (1987) co-integration test is as follows. Initially, the co-
integration equation is estimated using variables shown by the case of price the relationship 
between producer and wholesale levels as shown below;  
𝑊𝑃𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑃𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡     (3.1) 
where 𝑊𝑃𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝑡 are the pork wholesale price and the hog producer price, respectively. 
These two variables are expressed in logged terms. 𝜀𝑡 is the error term assuming a white 
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noise process. Second, by using the residuals obtained from Equation (3.1), ADF tests for 
stationarity of residuals is used to estimate 𝛾0 in the following equation: 
∆𝜀?̂? = 𝛾0𝜀?̂?−1 + 𝜌0∆𝜀?̂?−1 + 𝜑𝑡     (3.2)   
where 𝜑𝑡 is a white noise process. If the null of 𝐻0: 𝛾0 = 0 is rejected, the residuals (𝜀?̂?) 
are stationary with zero mean. This implies that two variables are co-integrated with each 
other in the sense that establishment of a long-run equilibrium relationship between two 
variables is valid.  
Meanwhile, Enders and Granger (1998), on the other hand, indicate that the 
inconsistent results of co-integration might be derived due to asymmetric adjustment of 
series. Therefore, they suggest an alternative specification allowing for asymmetric 
adjustment such as threshold autoregressive (TAR) model, and it can be written in the form 
of (3.3) ~ (3.5): 
∆𝜀?̂? = 𝐼𝑡𝛾1𝜀?̂?−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝑡)𝛾2𝜀?̂?−1 + 𝜔𝑡      (3.3) 
where ∆𝜀?̂? is changes in the {𝜀?̂?} from Equations (3.1), 𝛾1 is coefficients of adjustment to 
positive deviation, and 𝛾2  is coefficients of adjustment to negative discrepancies. The 
specification of the Heaviside indicator function (𝐼𝑡) is in the forms of Equation (3.4) and 
(3.5), which depends on estimated threshold (𝜏);  
𝐼𝑡 = {
1      𝑖𝑓      𝜀?̂?−1 ≥ 𝜏  
0      𝑖𝑓      𝜀?̂?−1 < 𝜏
       (3.4) 
𝐼𝑡 = {
1      𝑖𝑓      Δ𝜀?̂?−1 ≥ 𝜏  
0      𝑖𝑓     Δ 𝜀?̂?−1 < 𝜏
     (3.5) 
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According to Tong (1983), the sample mean of the residuals is not the same as the 
long-run equilibrium equal to zero due to possibility of asymmetric adjustment. For this 
reason, Chan (1993) suggests that finding the possible long-run equilibrium values to 
estimate the fitted model with the minimum sum of squared errors as a super-consistent 
estimate of threshold (𝜏) should be required. For example, the estimation procedures of the 
threshold proposed by Chan (1993) have the following steps: first, the residual (∆𝜀?̂? ) 
obtained from co-integration equation are arranged in ascending order; second, 15% of the 
minimum observations and 15% of the maximum observations are excluded, and then the 
rest of 70% of the residuals are regarded as a possible threshold; and finally, for each 
possible threshold values, the threshold that minimizes the sum of squared residuals from 
the fitted model is chosen. This can be considered as the super-consistent TAR or M-TAR 
model.   
The combination of Equation (3.3) and (3.4) stand for the TAR model and the 
combination of Equation (3.3) and (3.5) represent the M-TAR model. Enders and Granger 
(1998) describe both models that the “deep” movement of {𝜀?̂?} can be captured by the TAR 
model, “sharp” movement of {𝜀?̂?} can be detected by the M-TAR model
9. To interpret the 
adjustment rate of 𝛾1  and 𝛾2 , if for example, −1 < 𝛾1 < 𝛾2 < 0 , the TAR model 
represents that the positive discrepancies of the 𝜀?̂? series will tend to return rapidly toward 
the long-run equilibrium relative to the negative discrepancies of the 𝜀?̂? series. Furthermore, 
                                                          
9 According to Ghoshray (2002, p 301), “deepness indicates the asymmetry in the magnitude of 
peaks and troughs and sharpness represents the asymmetry in the form of differing speeds at which 
peaks and troughs are approached”.  
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if, for example, |𝛾1| < |𝛾2| , the M-TAR model suggests that the negative  ∆𝜀?̂?−1  is 
substantially in decay, while the positive ∆𝜀?̂?−1 is little adjusted to the long-run equilibrium.  
There are two hypotheses test by applying for the TAR and M-TAR models. The 
first procedure is that co-integration of a pairs of series is tested. The Φ-statistics for the 
null hypothesis (𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0) that the series are not co-integrated is applied. The 
critical values of the Φ-statistics are computed by Enders and Granger (1998). If the null 
hypothesis (𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0) is rejected, a pairs of series are co-integrated. This allows us 
to test for the asymmetric price adjustment with regard to the co-integrated pairs of series. 
In this case, F-statistics for the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment (𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2) are 
recorded. If the null hypothesis is retained, there is sufficient evidence in support of the 
presence of symmetric price adjustment. Diagnostic checking for a white noise process for 
the residuals 𝜔𝑡 is performed by using the Breusch–Godfrey test, the Ljung-Box test, and 
Durbin Watson test. If there is serially correlation of the residuals, Equation (3.3) should 
be re-estimated by adding the additional lags of ∆𝜀?̂? in the form of:  
∆𝜀?̂? = 𝐼𝑡𝛾1𝜀?̂?−1 + (1 − 𝐼𝑡)𝛾2𝜀?̂?−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
Δ𝜀?̂?−1 + 𝜔𝑡      (3.6) 
If a pairs of price series are co-integrated and adjustment is symmetric, the ECM in 
the following form is the example in the relationship between farm and wholesale level: 
Δ𝑊𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜆1𝜀?̂?−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
Δ𝑊𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=0
Δ𝑃𝑃𝑡−𝑗+𝜇𝑡      (3.7) 
where Δ𝑊𝑃𝑡 and Δ𝑃𝑃𝑡 are a vectors of the logged first differences for wholesale and farm 
prices, respectively, 𝜀?̂?−1  is the error correction terms representing adjustment to 
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discrepancies from the long-run equilibrium, 𝜆1 indicates the short-run adjustment rate of 
the dependent variable to the long-run and negative sign of error correction should be 
required, and 𝜇𝑡 is the error term. The selection of the correct lag length is conducted by 
minimizing the Schwarz criterion (SBC), and test for autocorrelation of the residuals, 𝜇𝑡 is 
conducted by using the Ljung-Box Q test, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test, and Durbin-
Watson test.  
If either one of the TAR and the M-TAR models or both models assure that the null 
hypotheses of symmetric price adjustment (𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2) is rejected, the asymmetric ECM 
can be specified as follows: 
Δ𝑊𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
Δ𝑊𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=0
Δ𝑃𝑃𝑡−𝑗+𝜆2𝜀?̂?−1
+ + 𝜆3𝜀?̂?−1
− + 𝜓𝑡       (3.8) 
where 𝜀?̂?−1
+  and 𝜀?̂?−1
−  represent the positive and negative deviations to the long-run 
equilibrium created by a change in Δ𝑃𝑃𝑡, and 𝜓𝑡 is error terms.  
Besides, the number of months (n) it takes the 𝑊𝑃𝑡 series to adjust back to the 
equilibrium after the change in 𝑃𝑃𝑡 can be estimated. by using the formula in the study by 
Ghoshray (2002): 
𝑛 =
log (1 − 𝑝)
log (1 − 𝜆𝑖)
      (3.9) 
where p represents a given proportional probability of the disequilibrium to be corrected, 
and 𝜆𝑖, where (i = 1,2,3) is the coefficients of short-run adjustment rate Equation (3.7) 
and (3.8).  
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3.4. Data 
Empirical investigation in this study is conducted by using the 132 monthly 
observations of producer, wholesale, and retail prices for pork in the United States over the 
time period from January 2005 to December 2015. The producer prices (PP, USD per cwt) 
and the wholesale prices (WP, USD per cwt) represent barrow and gilt price and price of 
Central U.S. pork cutout composite sourced from the USDA/ERS, respectively. The retail 
prices (RP, USD per cwt) stand for retail pork value of retail weight equivalent obtained 
from USDA/ERS. All series are expressed in logarithm in the regression. Descriptive 
statistics and characteristic of each data series are found in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1. Basic statistical measures of the price series in levels 
Variable Obs Min Max Mean SD Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
PP 132 36.56 95.17 55.09 11.77 138.53 0.79 0.64 
WP 132 54.94 133.58 79.33 16.28 264.91 0.78 0.63 
RP 132 276.29 421.55 326.27 43.20 1866.48 0.53 -1.05 
Source: USDA/ERS.  
 
The visualized plots of each price series in this study are presented in Figure 3.1. 
As shown in the graphs, producer prices and wholesale prices appear to move together over 
time. However, all price series obviously appear to have an increasing trend over time and 
variation of price series is generally intensified at the end of sample period in the sense that 
all price series might be non-stationary.  
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Figure 3.1. The plot of hog and pork price series 
 
 Source: USDA/ERS.  
3.5. Empirical results 
3.5.1. Testing for a unit root  
The test for a unit root is conducted by using the ADF, PP and KPSS tests. The 
approach to find the appropriate length of lags is based on the lowest BIC. According to 
Table 3.2, the ADF and PP test assure that all price series in log levels are non-stationary 
by retaining the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of the series. However, the KPSS test 
suggests that all series in log levels are non-stationary because its null of stationarity of 
series is rejected. As combining three test results, all price series need to be differenced to 
make them stationary. 
According to the results of Table 3.3, on the other hand, the null hypothesis that 
price series in the first difference is non-stationary is rejected from the results of the ADF 
94 
 
and the PP test, and the fact that all price series in the first difference are stationary is 
confirmed by the KPSS test. As combining the results, all price series analyzed are 
integrated of order one.  
Table 3.2. Results of stationary tests in each logged pork prices 
  
No. of  
lags 
ADF PP KPSS 
Drift 
Drift & 
trend 
Drift 
Drift & 
trend 
Drift Trend 
PP 1 -2.73* -2.94 -2.51 -2.68 2.52** 0.32** 
WP 2 -2.49 -3.13 -2.41 -3.01 2.27** 0.21** 
RP 2 -0.79 -2.91 -0.54 -2.56 4.41** 0.45** 
Notes: * and ** are for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. The critical value of ADF and 
PP tests at 5% and 10% significance level are obtained from the R. Davidson and J.G. Mackinnon 
(1993), Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. The critical values of test with a drift and with 
a drift and a trend (n = 100) at 5% significance are -2.89 and -3.45, respectively and at 10% 
significance are -2.58 and -3.15, respectively. The critical values of KPSS test for a drift and with 
a trend at 5% significance are 0.463 and 0.146, respectively and at 10% significance are 0.347 and 
0.119, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3.3. Results of stationary tests in the each logged first differenced pork prices 
  
No. of  
lags 
ADF PP KPSS 
Drift 
Drift & 
trend 
Drift 
Drift & 
trend 
Drift Trend 
PP 1 -7.41** -7.40** -10.05** -10.04** 0.08 0.06 
WP 1 -7.73** -7.71** -9.83** -9.80** 0.05 0.05 
RP 1 -6.23** -6.19** -7.90** -7.87** 0.10 0.08 
Notes: ** stand for 5% significance level, respectively. The critical value of ADF and PP tests at 
5% and 10% significance level are obtained from the R. Davidson and J.G. Mackinnon (1993), 
Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. The critical values of test with a drift and with a drift 
and a trend (n = 100) at 5% significance are -2.89 and -3.45, respectively and at 10% significance 
are -2.58 and -3.15, respectively. The critical values of KPSS test for a drift and with a trend at 5% 
significance are 0.463 and 0.146, respectively and at 10% significance are 0.347 and 0.119, 
respectively. 
 
 
3.5.2. Threshold co-integration tests 
For the co-integrating test that assumes that price transmission is symmetric, the 
Engle-Granger two step procedure is conducted by initially estimating Equation (3.1) by 
OLS, and then by testing that the residuals estimated in the fitted model have a unit root. 
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If the null hypothesis of 𝐻0: 𝛾0 = 0 is rejected, this suggests that residuals are stationary 
with zero mean, which implies that two price series are co-integrated with each other.   
Table 3.4. Results of Engle-Granger co-integration tests  
  
Co-integrating regression ADF test 
𝛼0 𝛼1 No. of lag 𝛾0 𝑄(6)  𝐿𝑀𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡  DW 
WP - PP 0.64 [7.62]**  0.93 [44.06]** 1  -1.92* 9.60 (0.15) 0.52 (0.47) 1.99 
RP - WP 3.62 [22.49]**  0.50 [13.41]**  1 -2.42**  3.95 (0.68) 1.52 (0.22) 1.97 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. The t-statistic is stated in a 
square bracket. 𝛼0 and 𝛼1 are parameters in equation 2-1. ADF test is conducted by using residuals 
of equation 2-1 to estimate the following equation: ∆𝜀?̂? = 𝛾0𝜀?̂?−1 + 𝜌0∆𝜀?̂?−1 + 𝜑𝑡, where 𝜑𝑡 is a 
white noise process. The critical values of ADF test with zero mean (n = 100) at 5% significance 
is -1.95 and at 10% significance is -1.61. The p-values are stated in parenthesis for the Ljung-Box 
Q-statistic and Breusch–Godfrey statistic for autocorrelation of residuals. 
 
Table 3.4 presents the results of Engle-Granger co-integration test. The parameter 
𝛼1 stand for the price transmission elasticity. The estimate of 𝛼1 are significantly different 
from zero at the 5% significance level in both price relationships. To interpret this, in the 
price relationship between producer and wholesaler, a one percent increase in producer 
price results in a 0.93 percent increase in wholesale price. Furthermore, in the case of 
wholesaler and retailer, retail price is increased by 0.50 percent given a one percent increase 
in wholesale price.  
For the results of the Engle-Granger test, the estimated values of 𝛾0 are -1.92 and -
2.42 for the case of producer and wholesale prices and the case of wholesale and retail 
prices, respectively. The null hypothesis in the case of the producer and wholesale prices 
is rejected at the 10% significance level, and for the case of wholesale and retail price, the 
null hypothesis is also rejected at the 5% level of significance as compared to the critical 
values. This suggests that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship in between producer 
and wholesale prices and between wholesale and retail prices in the U.S. pork market. 
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Meanwhile, the Ljung-Box Q-statistic, Breusch–Godfrey and Durbin-Watson statistic 
assure that the residuals (𝜑𝑡) of Equation (3.2) are uncorrelated.    
Next, in order to conduct a threshold co-integration test allowing for the assumption 
of asymmetric price transmission in this study, the TAR and the M-TAR models are 
estimated by using two threshold values with zero and consistent threshold estimates with 
the Heaviside Indicator function as an attractor. The results of the TAR model are presented 
in Table 3.5. Based on the SBC, the consistent TAR model is preferable to the TAR model 
with the zero attractor in both cases of price relationships. For the consistent TAR model 
in each price relationship, adjustment rates of 𝛾1 (positive shock showing a decrease in 
producer or wholesale price) are insignificant, while adjustment rates of 𝛾2 (negative shock 
an increase in producer or wholesale price) are significantly different from zero at the 5% 
of significance level. Focusing on the adjustment rate of a negative shock, in the case of 
producer and wholesale price relationship, the point estimate of 𝛾2 (-0.25) suggests that 
approximately 25 percent of negative shocks from a long-run equilibrium is corrected in a 
month. The 𝛾2 (-0.17) in the case of wholesale and retail price relationship shows that about 
17 percent of a negative discrepancy from a long-run equilibrium is eliminated in a month. 
When it comes to the hypotheses tests, Φ-statistics for the case of producer and wholesale 
price and that of wholesale and retail price in the consistent TAR model are 4.65 and 3.92, 
respectively. The null hypothesis of 𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 is rejected because these values of 
Φ-statistics are larger than the critical value of 4.64 at the 5% significance level and 3.79 
at the 10% significance level respectively, which means that a pairs of prices are co-
integrated. Additionally, F-statistics recorded to test for asymmetric price transmission in 
the price relationship between producer and wholesale level and the case of wholesale and 
97 
 
retail level from the consistent TAR model are 2.24 and 1.93, respectively. Retaining the 
null hypothesis of 𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 in both cases of the price relationships is allowed due to 
lower values of each F-statistic than the critical value, indicating that price flow from 
producer to wholesale, and wholesale to retail are symmetrically transmitted. A diagnostic 
check for the autocorrelation of residuals indicates that residuals of the consistent TAR 
model for both cases are significantly uncorrelated with each other.  
Table 3.5. The results of TAR model across the pork marketing channels 
 WP - PP RP - WP 
TAR Consistent TAR TAR Consistent TAR 
Lag length 0 0 1 1 
𝛾1 -0.08 [-1.03] -0.18 [-0.96] -0.06 [-1.08] -0.05 [-1.00] 
𝛾2 -0.25 [-2.82]** -0.25 [-2.89]** -0.16 [-2.55]** -0.17 [-2.65]** 
 𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 (Φ) 4.52* 4.65** 3.72 3.92* 
𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 (𝐹)  2.01 (0.16) 2.24 (0.14) 1.54 (0.22) 1.93 (0.17) 
 Τ 0 0.0192 0 -0.0247 
𝑄(6) 9.99 (0.13) 10.40 (0.11) 3.92 (0.69) 3.95 (0.68) 
𝐿𝑀𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡  2.39 (0.12) 2.45 (0.12) 2.50 (0.15) 2.06 (0.15) 
 𝐷𝑊 2.19 2.19 1.97 1.97 
 𝐹𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 4.52 (0.01) 4.64 (0.01) 2.55 (0.06) 2.69 (0.05) 
SBC -531.25 -531.48 -470.27 -470.67 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 stand for the 
coefficients of adjustment and 𝑡-statistics is in bracket for the null hypothesis 𝛾1 = 0 and 𝛾2 = 0, 
respectively. Values of 𝛷-statistic for the TAR model with n = 100 for the null hypothesis 𝛾1 =
𝛾2 = 0 at 5% and 10% significance levels are 4.64 and 3.79, respectively. Critical values for 𝛷-
statistic are computed by Enders and Granger (1998). P-values are stated in the parenthesis for the 
Ljung-Box Q-statistic, Breusch–Godfrey statistic, and F-statistic.    
 
According to Table 3.6, the consistent M-TAR model can be regarded as a more 
appropriate model due to the lower value of the SBC in both cases of price relationship. In 
both cases, adjustment rates of 𝛾1  are insignificant, while adjustment rates of 𝛾2  are 
significant at the 5% significance level. From these results, the point estimate of 𝛾2 (-0.44) 
for the case of producer and wholesale prices represents that approximately 44 percent of 
a negative deviation from a long-run equilibrium is eliminated within a month. Similarly, 
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in the case of the relationship between wholesale and retail price, point estimate of 𝛾2 (-
0.25) shows that approximately 25 percent of a negative discrepancy from a long-run 
equilibrium is eliminated within a month.  
Table 3.6. The results of M-TAR model across the pork marketing channels 
 WP - PP RP - WP 
M-TAR Consistent M-TAR M-TAR Consistent M-TAR 
Lag length 0 0 0 0 
𝛾1 -0.14 [-1.25] -0.09 [-1.36] 0.04 [0.35] -0.03 [-0.55] 
𝛾2 -0.26 [-1.90]* -0.44 [-3.38]** 0.04 [0.29] -0.25 [-3.35]** 
 𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 (Φ) 2.59 6.63** 0.10 5.74** 
𝐻0 ∶ 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 (𝐹)  0.45 (0.50) 5.81 (0.02) 0.00 (0.97) 6.47 (0.01) 
 τ 0 -0.0241 0 -0.0209 
𝑄(6) 14.20 (0.03) 9.52 (0.15) 8.70 (0.19) 9.62 (0.14) 
𝐿𝑀𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡  1.69 (0.19) 3.13 (0.08) 1.11 (0.29) 2.41 (0.12) 
 𝐷𝑊 2.03 2.22 1.98 1.76 
 𝐹𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 2.59 (0.08) 6.63 (0.00) 0.10 (0.90) 6.63 (0.00) 
SBC -522.74 -530.40 -467.74 -478.71 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 stand for the 
coefficients of adjustment and 𝑡-statistics is in bracket for the null hypothesis 𝛾1 = 0 and 𝛾2 = 0, 
respectively. Values of 𝛷-statistic for the M-TAR model with n = 100 for the null hypothesis 
𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 at 5% and 10% significance levels are 5.02 and 4.11, respectively. Critical values for 
𝛷-statistic are computed by Enders and Granger (1998). P-values are stated in the parenthesis for 
the Ljung-Box Q-statistic, Breusch–Godfrey statistic, and F-statistic.    
 
From the results of the threshold co-integration test with the null hypothesis of 𝐻0 ∶
𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0, for both price relationships in the case of producer and wholesale price 
relationship and wholesale and retail price relationship, the consistent M-TAR model 
supports that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship in each price combination by 
rejecting the null at the 5% significance level. Furthermore, by contrast with the results of 
the consistent TAR model, 𝐹-statistics of both cases to test for the null hypothesis of 𝐻0 ∶
𝛾1 = 𝛾2 of the consistent M-TAR model are greater than the critical value at the 5% level 
of significance. These results suggest that price transmission from producer price to 
wholesale price, and wholesale price to retail price is asymmetrically adjusted. In addition, 
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the residuals of the consistent M-TAR model in both cases are significantly uncorrelated 
based on the results of diagnostic checking from the Ljung-Box, Breusch–Godfrey and 
Durbin-Watson test.  
In short, given the results from the four different models, the consistent model 
would be preferable to the model with zero mean threshold based on the value of the SBC. 
Specifically, a consistent M-TAR model can be considered as an appropriate model to 
explain asymmetric price adjustment in the U.S. pork market. In this context, if either the 
TAR model or the M-TAR model can support the null hypothesis of asymmetric price 
transmission, an ECM should be specified to allow for asymmetric price transmission in 
this study.  
3.5.3. Estimation of asymmetric error correction model  
As mentioned above, given the finding that the consistent M-TAR model supports 
the evidence of asymmetric price transmission, asymmetric ECM should be specified to 
estimate the price adjustment to positive and negative shocks and the short-run dynamic in 
this study.  
Table 3.7 represents estimation results of asymmetric ECM. First, estimates of 
asymmetric ECM for the case of producer and wholesale price are reported in the first and 
second column. In the first column, wholesale price responds significantly and quickly to 
negative shock, 𝜀?̂?−1
− , created by increase in producer price, while it tends to be more 
persistent to positive shock, 𝜀?̂?−1
+ , created by a decrease in producer price. Specifically, 
wholesale price adjusts to correct approximately 23 percent of negative deviation from the 
long-run equilibrium created by an increase in producer price within a month. On the other 
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hand, wholesale price adjusts to correct only 6 percent, approximately, of positive 
discrepancy from the long equilibrium created by a decrease in producer price within a 
month. For the long-run adjustment of wholesale price to positive and negative shocks by 
using Equation (3.9), it will take about 8.8 months to adjust toward the long-run 
equilibrium  to negative shocks created by an increase in producer price, while, for  positive 
shocks created by a decrease in producer price, it will take approximately 39.8 months. 
This suggests that adjustment of wholesale price toward a long-run equilibrium is faster as 
producer price increases than as producer price decreases. On the other hand, in the second 
column, producer price responds insignificantly to positive or negative shocks created by 
a decrease or an increase in wholesale price.  
Table 3.7. Estimates of the asymmetric ECM across the pork marketing channels 
 Dependent variable 
Producer to wholesale price 
relationship 
Wholesale to retail price  
relationship 
∆𝑊𝑃𝑡  ∆𝑃𝑃𝑡  ∆𝑅𝑃𝑡  ∆𝑊𝑃𝑡 
Constant -0.001 [-0.33] 0.003 [0.25] 0.002 [0.97] 0.02 [1.54] 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑡  0.79 [28.22]** - - - 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑡−1 0.07 [0.82] -0.28 [-1.08] - - 
∆𝑊𝑃𝑡 - - 0.02 [1.37] - 
∆𝑊𝑃𝑡−1 -0.10 [-1.08] 0.52 [1.76] 0.07 [4.73]** 0.29 [2.97]** 
∆𝑅𝑃𝑡−1 - - 0.23 [3.11]** 0.06 [0.12] 
𝜀?̂?−1
+  -0.06 [-0.60] -0.30 [-0.88] -0.04 [-1.73]* -0.35 [-2.71]** 
𝜀?̂?−1
−  -0.23 [-2.09]** -0.003 [-0.01] -0.04 [-1.26] -0.02 [-0.22] 
𝑄(6) 14.39 (0.03) 8.95 (0.18) 4.41 (0.62) 6.42 (0.38) 
𝐿𝑀𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡  2.28 (0.13) 0.95 (0.33) 12.89 (0.00) 0.45 (0.50) 
 𝐷𝑊 2.03 1.96 2.28 2.03 
 𝐹𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 165.26 (0.00) 1.88 (0.12) 14.95 (0.00) 3.38 (0.01) 
Notes: * and ** stand for 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. t-values are stated in a 
square bracket. 𝜀?̂?−1
+  and 𝜀?̂?−1
−  stand for error correction terms representing adjustment rate with 
respect to increasing and decreasing deviations from the long-run equilibrium, respectively. p-
values are stated in a parenthesis for the Ljung-Box Q-statistic, Breusch–Godfrey statistic, and F-
statistic. 
  Meanwhile, 𝐹(5,124) -statistic recorded to test for the null hypothesis that both 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in the producer price does not affect the wholesale 
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price is 165.26. Since the critical value of 2.29 at the 5% of significance level is less than 
F-statistic recorded the null hypothesis is rejected. The response of wholesale price is 
significantly derived by only a contemporaneous change in the producer price. In the case 
for producer price as a dependent variable, since 1.88 of 𝐹(4,125)-statistic recorded for the 
null hypothesis that producer price is not affected by lagged changes in wholesale price is 
less than a critical value (2.45) at the 5% level of significance, the null hypothesis is not 
rejected. In short, in the case of the relationship between producer and wholesale prices, 
there is unidirectional price adjustment from producer to wholesale price. The possible 
explanation of this result is that it might be difficult for producers to adjust production to a 
transitory change in the wholesale price in the short-run due to the biological constraints 
of hog production. In contrast, wholesalers are able to relatively quickly adjust prices to a 
change in producer prices. This is consistent with the possible behavior of wholesalers 
described in the previous study that wholesalers respond more quickly to margin squeezing 
(an increase in producer price) than margin stretching (a decrease in producer price). As 
aforementioned, this may not be unrelated with imperfect competition in the pork 
processing level, exerting market power by a small number of meat packers.  
Next, for the results of the price relationship between wholesale price and retail 
price, in the third column, the adjustment rates of retail price to positive and negative shock 
are the same, while the retail price only responds significantly to a positive shock, 𝜀?̂?−1
+ , 
created by a decrease in wholesale price. Specifically, the retail price adjusts to correct 
approximately only 4 percent toward a long-run equilibrium to positive shock (decrease in 
wholesale price) within a month. On the other hand, in the fourth column, wholesale price 
responds significantly and strongly to positive shock created by a decrease in retail price. 
102 
 
With the point estimate of positive error correction terms, wholesale price adjusts to correct 
approximately 35 percent of positive deviation from the long-run equilibrium created by a 
decrease in retail price within a month. In terms of the long-run correction adjustment given 
a 90 percent probability with regard to retail price, 55.8 months will be required to adjust 
toward the long-run equilibrium to the positive shocks (decrease in wholesale price). 
However, for the wholesale price, it will take only about 5.3 months to adjust to a positive 
shock (decrease in retail price).  
The null hypothesis that retail price is not affected by both contemporaneous and 
lagged changes in wholesale price is rejected because the 𝐹(5,124)-statistic (14.95) is greater 
than a critical value of 2.29 at the 5% significance level. The response of retail price is 
significantly derived by only a lagged change in wholesale price. Similarly, the 𝐹(4,125)-
statistic recorded for the null hypothesis that wholesale price is not affected by lagged 
changes in retail price is 3.38, which is larger than a critical value of 2.45 at the 5% level 
of significance. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected as well in its relationship of the model. 
This finding suggests that there is bidirectional price adjustment in the case of the 
relationship between wholesale and retail price.  
In focusing on the point estimate of positive shock in a relationship between 
wholesale prices and retail prices, the wholesale price adjusts quickly toward a long-run 
equilibrium in response to a decrease in retail price, while the retail price tends to adjust 
very slowly towards a long-run equilibrium to a decrease in wholesale prices. In this 
context, the possible explanation is that retailers have less incentive to lower the retail price 
when the wholesale price are lower because they can make additional profit. Additionally, 
retailers may be less likely to frequently adjust their prices to a transitory price change due 
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to adjustment costs (e.g., menu costs) accompanied by repricing or relabeling products. 
Since adjustment costs at the retail stage could lead to rigidity and less frequent repricing 
of retail price, wholesale price movements may induce a very sluggish response in retail 
prices. That is, agents at the very end of price chain may have more flexibility of how 
quickly to adjust while agents in the middle of the chain, like wholesalers, leave little room 
for not changing. Another plausible explanation is that retailers may exercise oligopsony 
power to enable them to make up for margin reduction due to a decrease in output price by 
quickly being passed through to wholesalers with a low rate10.  
The conclusion  of wholesalers’ behavior in adjusting more quickly to the price 
signal for squeezing margins than stretching margins in the unidirectional price flow from 
producer to wholesale level found in this study is consistent with the results analyzed in 
the price transmission studies by Hahn (1990), Miller and Hayenga (2001), and Abdulai 
(2002) for the pork market. The results in this study, on the other hand, are in contradiction 
to the results of the previous studies for the U.S. pork market by Boyd and Brorsen (1988) 
and Goodwin and Harper (2000) in terms of asymmetric pattern of price adjustment. In 
addition, in contrast with the results reported by Goodwin and Harper (2000), the price 
flow in the relationship between wholesale and retail levels appears to be bidirectional but 
                                                          
10 When it comes to this view, the findings on the positive relationship between firms’ concentration 
and wholesale-retail margin reported by Schroeter, Azzam, and Zhang (2000) indicate that there is 
little evidence of oligopoly power by meat packers but some evidence of oligopsony power by 
retailers in the U.S. pork market.  
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retail market shocks have a much greater effect on wholesale price in the price flow from 
retail to the wholesale stage than the price flow in the opposite direction.  
The literature has proposed various factors such as imperfect competition (market 
power), adjustment costs, input availability at different marketing channels, and price 
policies to explain the presence of asymmetric price transmission across the marketing 
chain. The findings in this study, which are not largely different from other research, 
suggest that there is evidence of asymmetric price adjustment in the U.S. pork market. This 
implies that the recent structural change in the U.S. pork industry does not improve market 
efficiency by undermining the price transmission mechanism across the marketing channel. 
Finally, due to practical constraints, the econometric models in this study are specified to 
only test for asymmetric price transmission, but not to examine the direct effects on price 
transmission to these factors mentioned above. A full discussion of this lies beyond the 
scope of this study. It is necessary to develop the model to examine how these factors affect 
price transmission at the intermediate level in the U.S. pork market in the future study.    
3.6. Conclusion  
This study aims to examine asymmetric price transmission of pork prices from the 
farm to the wholesale, and the wholesale to the retail levels in the U.S. pork market by 
using threshold co-integration analysis proposed by Enders and Granger (1998) as an 
alternative method when evaluating monthly producer, wholesale, and retail prices over 
the period from January 2005 to December 2015. Specifically, the application of the 
threshold co-integration approach is to ensure the consistent ECM model allows for the 
possible asymmetric pattern of price adjustment presented in the previous studies in such 
a way that adjustment of the margin is relatively faster to squeezing margins as compared 
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to stretching margins due to the existence of market power across marketing chain. For this 
purpose, both threshold autoregressive (TAR) model and momentum threshold 
autoregressive (M-TAR) model are used to test for asymmetric price transmission. 
Therefore, the findings can provide information for policy implications in accessing the 
benefits of the recent structural changes in the U.S. pork market in terms of market 
efficiency.  
Focusing on the main results, the consistent M-TAR model supports that the 
evidence of asymmetric price transmission in both the case of the producer price to the 
wholesale price and the wholesale price to the retail price. In the case of the producer price 
to the wholesale price, the wholesale price adjusts quicker toward the long-run equilibrium 
to an increase in the producer price than to a decrease in the producer price. Similarly, in 
the case of the wholesale price to the retail price, an increase in the wholesale price tends 
to be passed on to retail price relatively faster than a decrease in the wholesale price. This 
is consistent with the notion of an asymmetric pattern of price transmission across the 
marketing chains from farm to wholesale, and from the wholesale to the retail level 
described in previous studies.  
The estimates from the asymmetric ECM estimation provide the characteristic of 
price flow, the short-run dynamic and the long-run price adjustment in each price 
relationship. In the case of the producer price to the wholesale price, the producer price is 
significantly transmitted to the wholesale price but not vice versa and the wholesale price 
more quickly adjusts towards the long-run equilibrium to an increase in the producer price 
than to a decrease in the producer price. In the case of the wholesale price to the retail price, 
there is the presence of bidirectional price flow for only positive shocks in its relationship, 
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but a decrease in retail price induces a quicker and stronger response of wholesale price 
than the response of retail price to a decrease in wholesale price in opposite direction.  
In vertical context, there are some main factors proposed in the previous studies 
leading to asymmetric price adjustment such as imperfect competition (market power), 
adjustment costs, price rigidify, input availability at different marketing channels. 
Although it may be difficult to determine the exact factor in support of the empirical 
findings in this study, asymmetric adjustment in the U.S. pork chain may be generally 
understood in the presence of noncompetitive pricing behavior by agents at a certain chain 
beyond farm gate. Therefore, when it comes to policy implications, the findings in this 
study may suggest that the recent structural changes in the U.S. pork market may not 
contribute to improving price transmission mechanism across the U.S. pork marketing 
channels. However, there is limitation in this study that the methods applied in this study 
do not identify how price transmission is made by these factors. Thus, it is necessary to 
examine the direct impact of these factors across marketing stages on price transmission in 
future research.  
3.7. References 
Abdulai, A. 2000. Spatial price transmission and asymmetry in the Ghanaian maize 
market. Journal of development economics 63(2): 327-349. 
Abdulai, A. 2002. Using threshold cointegration to estimate asymmetric price transmission 
in the Swiss pork market. Applied Economics. 34(6): 679-687. 
Awokuse, T. O., & Wang, X. 2009. Threshold effects and asymmetric price adjustments 
in US dairy markets. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne 
d'agroeconomie 57(2): 269-286. 
107 
 
Azzam, A. M. 1999. Asymmetry and rigidity in farm-retail price transmission. American 
journal of agricultural economics 81(3): 525-533. 
Bailey, D., & Brorsen, B. W. 1989. Price asymmetry in spatial fed cattle markets. Western 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 246-252. 
Bakucs, Z., Falkowski, J., & Fert, I. 2012. What Causes Asymmetric Price Transmission 
in Agro-food Sector. In Meta-analysis Perspective, contributed paper prepared for 
presentation at the 86th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society, 
University of Warwick, United Kingdom. 
Balke, N. S., & Fomby, T. B. 1997. Threshold cointegration. International economic 
review, 627-645. 
Balke, N. S., Brown, S. P., & Yucel, M. K. 1998. Crude oil and gasoline prices: an 
asymmetric relationship?. Economic Review-Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2. 
Bernard, J. C., & Willett, L. S. 1996. Asymmetric price relationships in the US broiler 
industry. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 28(02): 279-289. 
Blinder, A. S. 1982. Inventories and sticky prices: More on the microfoundations of 
macroeconomics. The American Economic Review 72(3): 334-348. 
Blinder, A., Canetti, E. R., Lebow, D. E., & Rudd, J. B. 1998. Asking about prices: a new 
approach to understanding price stickiness. Russell Sage Foundation. 
Boyd, M. S., & Brorsen, B. W. 1988. Price asymmetry in the U.S. pork marketing channel. 
North Central Journal of Agricultural Economics 10(1): 103-109. 
Chan, K. S. 1993. Consistency and limiting distribution of the least squares estimator of a 
threshold autoregressive model. The annals of statistics, 520-533. 
Dutta, S., Bergen, M., Levy, D., & Venable, R. 1999. Menu costs, posted prices, and 
multiproduct retailers. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 683-703. 
Dyck, J. H., & Nelson, K. E. 2003. Structure of the global markets for meat (No. 33701). 
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 
108 
 
Enders, W., & Granger, C. W. J. 1998. Unit-root tests and asymmetric adjustment with an 
example using the term structure of interest rates. Journal of Business & Economic 
Statistics 16(3): 304-311. 
Enders, W., & Siklos, P. L. 2001. Cointegration and threshold adjustment. Journal of 
Business & Economic Statistics 19(2): 166-176. 
Engle, R. F., & Granger, C. W. 1987. Co-integration and error correction: representation, 
estimation, and testing. Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society, 251-276. 
Food & Water Watch 2015. Factory Farm Nation: 2015 Edition.  
Ghoshray, A. 2002. Agricultural Economics Society Prize Essay Asymmetric Price 
Adjustment and the World Wheat Market. Journal of Agricultural Economics 53(2): 299-
317. 
Goodwin, Barry K., and Daniel C. Harper. "Price transmission, threshold behavior, and 
asymmetric adjustment in the US pork sector." Journal of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics 32.03 (2000): 543-553. 
Goodwin, B. K., & Holt, M. T. 1999. Price transmission and asymmetric adjustment in the 
US beef sector. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 81(3): 630-637. 
Goychuk, K., & Meyers, W. H. 2014. Black Sea and world wheat market price integration 
analysis. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne 
d'agroeconomie, 62(2), 245-261. 
Granger, C. W. J., & Lee, T. H. 1989. Investigation of production, sales and inventory 
relationships using multicointegration and non‐symmetric error correction models. Journal 
of applied econometrics. 4(S1): S145-S159. 
Griffith, G. R., & Piggott, N. E. (1994). Asymmetry in beef, lamb and pork farm-retail 
price transmission in Australia. Agricultural Economics 10(3): 307-316. 
Hahn, W. F. 1990. Price transmission asymmetry in pork and beef markets. The Journal of 
Agricultural Economics Research 42(4): 21-30. 
109 
 
Heady, E. O., Disslin, H. G., Jensen, H. R., & Johnson, G. L. 1958. Agricultural adjustment 
problems in a growing economy. Agricultural adjustment problems in a growing economy. 
Johansen, S. 1988. Statistical analysis of cointegration vectors. Journal of economic 
dynamics and control 12(2): 231-254. 
Houck, J. P. 1977. An approach to specifying and estimating nonreversible 
functions. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 59(3): 570-572. 
Kinnucan, H. W., & Forker, O. D. 1987. Asymmetry in farm-retail price transmission for 
major dairy products. American journal of agricultural economics 69(2): 285-292. 
Kovenock, D., & Widdows, K. 1998. Price leadership and asymmetric price rigidity. 
European Journal of Political Economy 14(1): 167-187. 
Kwiatkowski, D., Phillips, P. C., Schmidt, P., & Shin, Y. 1992. Testing the null hypothesis 
of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root: How sure are we that economic time 
series have a unit root? Journal of econometrics 54(1): 159-178. 
McCorriston, S., Morgan, C. W., & Rayner, A. J. 2001. Price transmission: the interaction 
between market power and returns to scale. European review of agricultural economics 
28(2). 
Meyer, J., & von Cramon-Taubadel, S. 2004. Asymmetric price transmission: a survey. 
Journal of agricultural economics 55(3): 581-611. 
Miller, D. J., & Hayenga, M. L. 2001. Price cycles and asymmetric price transmission in 
the US pork market. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 83(3): 551-562. 
National Farmers Union. 2014. The fact sheet for Grain Inspection, Packer and Stockyards 
Administration (GIPSA). 
Peltzman, S. 2000. Prices rise faster than they fall. Journal of political economy 108(3): 
466-502. 
Schroeter, J., & Azzam, A. 1991. Marketing margins, market power, and price uncertainty. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 73(4): 990-999. 
110 
 
Tong, H. 1983. Threshold Models in Non-Linear Time Series Analysis. Springer. New 
York. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 2006. Farm bill forum comment summaries: 
Agricultural Concentration. Release No. 0106.06. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service (USDA/ERS). 2016. 
Livestock & Meat Domestic Data. https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/livestock-
meat-domestic-data.aspx (accessed June 10, 2016) 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service (USDA/ERS). 2016. Meat 
Price Spread. https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/meat-price-spreads (accessed June 
10, 2016) 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA/NASS). 
2014. 2012 Census of Agriculture: U.S. Summary and State Data, Vol. 1. Geographic Area 
Series. Part 51 (AC-12-A-51). p. 21  
von Cramon-Taubadel, S. 1998. Estimating asymmetric price transmission with the error 
correction representation: An application to the German pork market. European review of 
agricultural economics 25(1): 1-18. 
Ward, R. W. 1982. Asymmetry in retail, wholesale, and shipping point pricing for fresh 
vegetables. American journal of agricultural economics, 205-212. 
Wolffram, R. 1971. Positivistic measures of aggregate supply elasticities: some new 
approaches—some critical notes. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 53(2): 
356-359. 
  
111 
 
VITA 
Native to Republic of Korea, JongYeol Yoon graduated with B.S. degree at 
Department of Environmental and Resource Ecnomics in Dankook University in Republic 
of Korea in 2003. He earned his Master’s degree of Agricultural Economics at Dankook 
University in 2005. The same year he stated working as a research assistant at Korea Rural 
Economic Institute (KREI). After he passed the exam of open recruitment in KREI in 2006, 
he worked at KREI for about 8 years. For about 4 years he was in charge of forecasting 
price and quantity for agricultural products, especially red pepper, potato, and Chinese 
cabbage in the Department of Agricultural Outlook and also worked in the Office of Future 
Policy Research from April 2010 to July 2013. JongYeol Yoon joined Ph.D program at the 
University of Missouri-Columbia in the fall semester of 2013. He stated working as a 
research assistant in the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics. 
 
